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Abstract
Systemic risk, the possibility that a triggering event such as the failure of a large
financial firm will seriously impair financial markets and harm the broader econ-
omy, has taken centre stage since the recent global financial crisis. In the wake of
the crisis, policy-makers worldwide have recognised the need to fill gaps in our un-
derstanding of the dynamics of the financial system, its non-linear relationship with
the real economy, and the factors responsible for alternating phases of stability and
instability characterising the system. This thesis addresses the aforementioned gaps
under three main headings related to systemic risk: overlapping portfolios, risk di-
versification and policy interaction. The insights developed suggest that specialised
financial institutions pose a great risk to the stability of the financial system when
banks are indirectly connected via overlapping portfolios. Furthermore, this work
shows that diversification serves multiple roles in relation to financial stability; on
the one hand diversification reduces the risk of an isolated bank failure, but on the
other hand it increases the risk of many joint failures. The findings of the analyses
are used to propose regulatory policies for improving financial stability and social
welfare. Lastly, in a bid to avoid the fallacy of composition risk that is associated
with the study of regulatory policies in isolation, this thesis also attempts to identify
the complex interactions of resolution, monetary, and macro-prudential policies.
Impact Statement
This thesis provides financial policy makers with a set of tools for predicting the
occurrence of a financial crisis and policy insights for guiding the economy in the
event of a crisis. In particular, this thesis sheds light on the impact of heterogeneity
in the overlapping portfolio network been financial institutions. The insights devel-
oped can be used to address one of the major drawbacks of the Basel accords in
ignoring the role of diversification for setting capital requirements. Moreover, this
work proposes a framework for assigning capital requirements capable of improving
financial stability in relation to the existing models. In addition, regulatory policies
that can improve the resilience of the financial system without imposing additional
capital requirements on banks are proposed. Further, this work highlights possible
unintended consequences of combining various policy instruments that may contra-
dict and conflict with the desired objective of the regulator. Finally, the non-linear
framework proposed in this thesis may help policy makers understand the true con-
sequences of diversification on financial stability and social welfare.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
U.S. house prices rapidly rose relative to consumer price inflation, rents, and me-
dian family income between 1998 and 2006 (Bullard et al. 2009). Bernanke (2005)
and Caballero et al. (2008) attribute the rapid growth to large capital inflows while
Taylor (2009) discuss the role of loose monetary policy in fuelling the housing
boom. During this period, the share of non-prime loans also increased rapidly (Di-
Martino and Duca 2007). Mortgage loans provided to borrowers with high default
risk such as home buyers with low income-to-loan ratios are typically classified as
non-prime. Non-prime loans performed well at the time because increasing house
prices meant borrowers were able to refinance or sell their houses at higher prices
(Bhardwaj and Sengupta 2009). This incentivised banks and other financial insti-
tutions to create several innovations in the mortgage market (such as collateralised
debt obligations - CDOs) to facilitate large purchases of these loans. Unfortunately,
house price began to decline in 2006 and borrowers found it difficult to repay their
loans. This situation rapidly escalated leading to sharp increases in foreclosures
and loan defaults as shown in Figure 1.1. By late 2007, several banks and financial
firms had begun incurring significant losses from their investments in the mortgage
market. Consequently, major financial institutions such as Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers etc. either failed or came close to failing but
for the intervention of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. This turmoil - orig-
inating from U.S. housing market, eventually led to the 2007 economic recession
that crippled economies worldwide. The crisis highlighted the significance of sys-
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Figure 1.1: U.S. house prices and foreclosures 1.
temic risk and exposed the inherent limitations of existing regulatory frameworks
for understanding the circumstances that tip the financial system from stability to
instability and its non-linear interaction with the real economy. Systemic risk is the
risk that a triggering event, such as the failure of a large financial firm, will seri-
ously impair financial markets and harm the broader economy (Bullard et al. 2009).
Existing economic models failed to predict the occurrence of the crisis and also left
policy makers clueless on what policies to implement in-order to guide the econ-
omy out of recession (Krugman 2011; Stiglitz 2011). As such, there is a growing
consensus for a complete paradigm shift from the existing frameworks to models
that treat the economy as a complex evolving system (Farmer and Foley 2009; Iori
and Porter 2018; Tesfatsion 2005). Jean-Claude Trichet (2010), President of the
European Central Bank at the time, captures this situation concisely by noting that
“...when the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial
models immediately became apparent. Macro-models failed to predict the crisis and
seemed incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a convinc-
ing manner. As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available models of
limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned
by conventional tools...” In the same spirit as these remarks, this thesis studies dy-
1Image reproduced from (Bullard et al. 2009)
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namics underlying the emergence of systemic risk under three major themes namely
overlapping portfolios, risk diversification and policy interactions. This was done
by employing agent-based and network modelling techniques in order to adequately
capture non-linear phenomena characterising a systemic financial crisis.
1.1 Research Objectives
The goal of this thesis is to provide insights into the dynamics underlying the emer-
gence of systemic financial crisis and develop mitigating regulatory policies. In
the following sections, I elaborate on the research objectives under three research
themes namely overlapping portfolios, risk diversification and policy interactions.
1.1.1 Overlapping Portfolios
Overlapping portfolios refer to indirect connections between financial firms due
to similar asset investments (Caccioli et al. 2014; Caccioli et al. 2015; Huang et al.
2013). These connections serve as a contagion channel for the propagation of mark-
to-market portfolio losses to one or more financial institutions - due to depression
in asset prices resulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same
assets. In some cases, these losses may be sufficient to cause additional institutions
to become distressed thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further
depression in asset prices. The 2007 quant crisis, for instance, was caused by a
similar scenario in which the rapid liquidation of the portfolio of one equity hedge
fund depressed prices of assets held by other funds causing them to embark on
additional rounds of selling which depressed asset prices even further and resulted
in large portfolio losses (see Khandani and Lo 2007, for an elaborate discussion).
Unfortunately, existing studies on overlapping portfolios have relied on the
assumption of homogeneity in the degrees and sizes of banks. However, empirical
findings show that real financial networks deviate from this assumption (Boss et
al. 2004; Braverman and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi
and Gallegati 2012). In particular, they provide evidence that bank degrees and
sizes follow heterogeneous distributions. Hence, our goal is to generalise existing
work to account for these features in-order to provide insights into the systemic risk
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contribution of different types of banks with varying degrees and sizes. Based on
the insights developed, I will proceed to study the effectiveness of existing capital
policy models in relation to improving financial stability. Lastly, I will leverage on
network correlation theory to investigate the possibility of reducing systemic risk
without imposing new capital requirements.
1.1.2 Risk Diversification
Banks are increasingly diversifying their balance sheets across several instruments
in order to reduce their individual riskiness. A major motivation for the increasing
similarity is rooted in the standard financial and perhaps intuitive diversification ad-
vice “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. Indeed, the seminal work of Markowitz
(1952) on portfolio selection provides evidence that diversification across various
asset classes reduces the aggregate risk of a bank’s portfolio. It is thus reasonable
to conclude that if each bank becomes less risky due to diversification then the fi-
nancial system as a whole should become more stable. Moreover, several reports
before the financial crisis found little evidence for a systemic breakdown of the fi-
nancial system owing to the high diversification levels at individual banks due to
the extent of financial innovation (Bartram et al. 2007; Elsinger et al. 2006; Furfine
2003). However, the financial system still came close to near collapse even though
banks, especially the big ones, had become largely diversified. This conundrum
on the true consequences of diversification, particularly as it affects the stability of
the financial system and the wider economy has prompted serious discussions from
policy makers and academics.
This thesis will shed light on this conundrum by developing an agent based
model in which risk is endogenously produced from an evolving stylised system.
This approach deviates from network modelling techniques in which the under-
lying dynamics is based on assumptions of exogenous shocks and static network
structures. However, specifying shocks ex-ante neglects the fact that economic and
financial shocks endogenously emerge from complex interactions. Further, our ap-
proach provides an opportunity to see if the financial system can endogenously
display the ”robust-yet-fragile” property popularly reported in the literature (Cac-
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cioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010; Mistrulli 2011). Also, I will investigate
the stability impact of preferential lending relationships between banks and firms
described in (Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012). Finally, I will use our
model to investigate the possibility of designing policies that endogenously permit
diversification without exacerbating systemic risk.
1.1.3 Policy Interactions
The financial crisis precipitated calls for additional policy overlays to improve the
stability of the financial system. However, combining these policy instruments with
existing regulatory policies could contradict and conflict with the desired objective
of the regulator and may even lead to unintended consequences on the financial sys-
tem. As such, addressing this challenge has become imperative for policy makers,
who are left with no other choice but to base their decisions on common sense and
anecdotal analogies to previous crisis (Farmer and Foley 2009). Unfortunately, reg-
ulatory policies have mostly been studied in isolation until recently thus bearing the
fallacy of composition risk (Angelini and Clerc 2011; Boissay 2011; Cosimano and
Hakura 2011; Derviz 2013; Dib 2010; Gauthier et al. 2012; Miles et al. 2013; Ryo
et al. 2010; Slovik and Courne`de 2011).
I address this challenge by studying the long-term impact of the resolution tool
used in resolving failed banks in the presence of monetary and macroprudential
policies using an agent based model that couples the real economy and a financial
system. I will model a central bank agent that uses a monetary rule that indexes in-
terest rate relative to changes to one or more economic conditions namely inflation,
unemployment & credit volume. Further, I will consider Basel II and Basel III reg-
ulatory frameworks as the possible macroprudential tools while bailout, bail-in and
P&A (purchase & assumption) are the possible instruments available to the central
bank for resolving failed banks.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In this section, I briefly discuss the contribution of this thesis to the literature on
systemic risk - in relation to the research themes considered in this thesis namely
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overlapping portfolios, risk diversification and policy interactions.
The work on overlapping portfolios reveals that if banks have a heterogeneous
degree distribution the system becomes less robust with respect to the initial failure
of a random bank, and that targeted shocks to the most specialised banks (i.e. banks
with low degrees) increases the probability of observing a cascade of defaults. In
contrast, a heterogeneous degree distribution for assets increases stability with re-
spect to random shocks, but not with respect to targeted shocks. Also, assigning
capital to banks in relation to their level of diversification reduces the probabil-
ity of observing cascades of defaults relative to size based allocations. Finally, a
non-capital based policy that improves the resilience of the system by introducing
disassortative mixing between banks and assets is proposed.
I then investigated the consequences of diversification on financial stability
and social welfare. To do this, an agent based model that couples the real economy
and a financial system is developed - by building on micro-behaviours described in
(Delli Gatti et al. 2011; Gualdi et al. 2015; Klimek et al. 2015; Poledna and Thurner
2016). I show that the model can reproduce several stylized facts reported in real
economies. We find that the risk of an isolated bank failure (i.e. idiosyncratic risk)
is decreasing with diversification. In contrast, the probability of joint failures (i.e.
systemic risk) is increasing with diversification which results in more downturns
in the real sector. This finding is important because it kicks against the traditional
reasoning that if each bank becomes less risky due to diversification then the fi-
nancial system as a whole should become more stable. It is this kind of reasoning
that brought false beliefs that the financial system was highly robust before the ad-
vent of the financial crisis. We find that the system displays a ”robust yet fragile”
behaviour particularly for low diversification. Moreover, introducing preferential
attachment into the lending links of the bank-firm network does not change the risk
profiles produced by the original model. However, preferential attachment increases
idiosyncratic risk but significantly reduces system risk in the financial system. Fi-
nally, I show that a regulatory policy that promotes bank-firm credit transactions
that reduce similarity between banks can improve financial stability whilst permit-
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ting diversification.
Lastly, I provide insights into the long term economic impact of different bank
resolution instruments used by regulators to resolve a failed bank in the presence of
prevailing monetary and macroprudential policies. We find that Basel III does not
always improve the stability of the financial system relative to Basel II. Specifically,
Basel III produces more bank defaults when the central bank follows an inflation
targeting monetary rule but reduces the frequency of defaults if the monetary pol-
icy rule also responds to changes in unemployment and credit volume. Further, a
bailout resolution strategy results in the most frequent bank defaults while the low-
est occurrence of bank defaults is achieved in a P&A regime for all combinations of
monetary and prudential policies. Also, I investigated the contribution of each Basel
III component and find that the performance of Basel III framework is mainly char-
acterised by the capital adequacy ratio and conservation buffer components while
the additional constraint imposed by leverage requirement does not seem to have
any reasonable impact on the performance of the framework. Moreover, the addi-
tional capital overlay Basel III components do not appear to be addictive under a
P&A regime.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The structure of the remaining parts of this thesis is presented in Figure 1.2. Further,
in the following paragraphs, I provide a brief description of each chapter and its
logical relationship with the rest of the thesis.
In Chapter 2, I present a review of relevant research work on systemic risk
associated with the objectives of this thesis. The subsequent chapters extend this
review by referencing pertinent literature within the context of their applicable ar-
eas. A general overview of the methodology considered in this thesis is presented
in Chapter 3 - implementation details are however provided in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 couples agent based modelling techniques and network theory in
order to study the systemic risk posed by indirect connections associated with over-
lapping portfolios between financial institutions. It has become necessary to model
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Figure 1.2: Thesis Structure
these connections because they serve as a key contagion channel for the propaga-
tion of losses to one or more financial institutions due to depression in asset prices
resulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same assets. A key
message from our findings is that specialised institutions (i.e. institutions who hold
significant amounts of specific assets) such as mortgage banks, building and loan
associations, specialist funds etc. pose a great risk to the stability of the financial
system. Our exploration of possible mitigating policies reveals that assigning cap-
ital to banks in relation to their level of diversification reduces the likelihood of
having a systemic financial crisis. An even deeper analysis shows that encourag-
ing dissortative mixing between banks and assets can improve financial stability
without imposing additional capital requirements. Although, the framework pre-
sented in Chapter 4 captures some important dynamics of the financial system high-
lighted during the crisis and enables the evaluation of regulatory policy responses.
However, its underlying dynamics is based on assumptions of exogenous shocks.
Specifying shocks ex-ante neglects the fact that economic and financial shocks en-
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dogenously emerge from complex interactions.
Chapter 5 breaks away from this mechanistic approach by explicitly consid-
ering an agent based model that couples the real economy and a financial system.
Here, I provide emergent profiles of the consequences of diversification on finan-
cial stability and social welfare. A central message highlighted in this chapter is
that diversification serves multiple roles; on one hand it reduces the risk of an iso-
lated bank failure (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) but on the other hand it increases the
risk of joint failures (i.e. systemic risk). The chapter provides key insights towards
appropriate regulatory responses. Specifically, I show that a regulatory policy that
promotes bank-firm credit transactions that reduce similarity between banks can
improve financial stability whilst permitting diversification.
The agent based model considered in Chapter 5 is deliberately simplified in-
order to understand the dynamics governing the behaviour of the financial system
and its interaction with the real economy. However, this approach neglects the im-
pact of joint regulatory responses since policies are studied in isolation and thus
bears a fallacy of composition risk. Chapter 6 addresses this challenge by extend-
ing the agent based model considered in Chapter 5. In particular, Chapter 6 sets
out to understand the long term economic impact of different bank resolution in-
struments used by regulators to resolve a failed bank in the presence of prevailing
monetary and macroprudential policies. A key message is that combining new poli-
cies with certain prevailing policies may not necessarily be beneficial. For instance,
combining the new Basel III framework recently proposed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) with an inappropriate monetary policy will not
improve the stability of the financial system. In fact, it would further contribute to
the risk of the systemic breakdown of the system.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
The concept of systemic risk has become highly pronounced since the recent global
financial crisis. Regulatory bodies around the world realised that they lacked a true
understanding of the dynamics underlying the emergence of risk from the finan-
cial system and the feedback consequences on the real economy. This situation
has led to a surge in the number of research work targeted at identifying sources
of systemic risk and channels through which risk spreads through the system. This
thesis addresses three major themes associated with systemic risk namely overlap-
ping portfolios, risk diversification and policy interactions. As such, this chapter
highlights relevant work that also address these systemic risk areas.
2.1 Overlapping Portfolios
Overlapping portfolios refers to indirect connections between financial institutions
that serve as a contagion channel for the propagation of mark-to-market portfolio
losses to one or more financial institutions due to depression in asset prices - re-
sulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same assets. In some
cases, these losses may be sufficient to cause additional institutions to become dis-
tressed thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further depression
in asset prices. Despite its significance, the literature is widely focused on the role
of counterparty and roll-over risks in propagating contagion (Allen and Gale 2000;
Caccioli et al. 2011; Gai et al. 2011; Hałaj and Kok 2014; Iori et al. 2006). Further,
existing studies on overlapping portfolios have relied on the assumption of homo-
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geneity in the degrees and sizes of banks. However, empirical findings show that
real financial networks deviate from this assumption (Boss et al. 2004; Braverman
and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Iori et al. 2008; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and
Gallegati 2012)
For instance, Cifuentes et al. (2005) study the impact of overlapping portfolios
by considering two channels of contagion in a stylised system of interconnected
financial institutions including direct counterparty connections and a layer of com-
mon asset holdings. The financial institutions are subject to regulatory constraints
and follow mark-to-market accounting rules. Liquidity risk is captured in their
model by a market impact function that results in the depression of illiquid assets
when the demand for such assets is not perfectly elastic. They show that mark-
ing the prices of assets to market can result in cascade of portfolio of losses which
may be sufficient to cause one or more financial institutions to become distressed
thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further depression in asset
prices. Further, they find that a regulatory policy that imposes liquidity requirement
on financial institutions can be as effective as setting capital requirements in ad-
dressing systemic externalities stemming from the network layer of common asset
holdings. In a similar work, Nier et al. (2007) study the impact of liquidity risk on
financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios in a stylised financial network of
interbank linkages. Similar to Cifuentes et al. (2005) liquidity risk arises in their
model from depression of asset prices due to forced sales of illiquid assets. They
find that this aggravates the likelihood of a systemic breakdown of the financial sys-
tem irrespective of its level of average interbank connectivity and total amount of
capital. Moreover, they show that the impact of liquidity risk becomes more pro-
nounced as the financial network becomes more concentrated. Further, Iori et al.
(2006) show that the interbank network - mainly overnight can have destabilizing
consequences on the financial system when banks have heterogeneous liquidity re-
serves.
In a related work, Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) study the importance of big and
highly connected banks on financial stability and regulatory responses using a uni-
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fied model of the financial system that captures three channels of contagion namely
liquidity hoarding, asset price depression due to overlapping portfolios and losses
due to direct linkages in a counterparty network. Their model also includes a dis-
tinct feature that captures the aggregate confidence in the system. They show that
large, well connected banks result in non-linear devastating impact on the stability
of the system. In agreement with the findings reported by Nier et al. (2007), they
further show that this effect becomes more pronounced with higher network con-
centration. Moreover, they show that the resilience of the system improves when
big banks are subject to higher capital requirements relative to small banks. Gai
and Kapadia (2010) adopt the market-impact function proposed by Cifuentes et al.
(2005) in order to study the impact of asset fire sales in a stylised financial system
of overlapping portfolios imposed upon a network layer of direct counterparty ex-
posures. They also show that including fire sales dynamics widens the region within
which contagion occurs with non-zero probability. May and Arinaminpathy (2010)
further show that this effect becomes more pronounced with increasing interbank
recovery rates. The relationship between asset fire sales and credit freeze-up dur-
ing a financial crisis is stressed in the work by Diamond and Rajan (2011). They
also propose alternative effective regulatory policies for resolving failed banks at
minimum cost to the tax payers.
Unfortunately, the models discussed so far only consider a single asset class
in their contagion channel due to overlapping portfolios which is far from reality.
Caccioli et al. (2014) addresses this limitation by generalising the model proposed
by Cifuentes et al. (2005) to a multi-asset case. They study the stability features of
financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios in a stylised model of the finan-
cial system consisting of a bipartite network of banks and assets. They characterise
the stability of the financial system in terms of leverage, diversification, market
impact and asset crowding. In their model, systemic risks is defined as the prob-
ability of observing a global cascade of bank defaults. Their analysis reveals that
the system undergoes two phase transitions with increasing diversification between
which global cascades can occur. Further, they find a critical leverage value be-
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low which the system is generally stable for a given average diversification value
and above which global cascades can occur with non-zero probability. However,
their approach relies on the assumption of homogeneity in the degrees and sizes
of all banks which may not necessarily be the case. In fact recent empirical stud-
ies (Braverman and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and
Gallegati 2012) show that real financial networks of common portfolio holdings
and balance sheet size distributions deviate from this assumption. Specifically, they
provide evidence of a power law in these distributions.
Complementary views on these findings are also reported by several empirical
studies. Huang et al. (2013) propose a stress test model for systemic risk propaga-
tion in bipartite network of banks and assets. Using a large dataset of 2007 US com-
mercial banks’ balance sheet data, they validate their model in terms of its ability to
identify banks that failed in the wake of the financial crisis. Similar to the findings
reported by Caccioli et al. (2014), they show that the system undergoes alternating
phases of stability and instability depending on the network parameters. In another
empirical study, Caccioli et al. (2015) analyse the impact of overlapping portfolios
of banks on financial stability using a stylised multi-layered network model of the
financial system using a dataset of balance sheet and interbank exposures detail of
the Austrian financial system. Interestingly, they show that counterparty risk on its
own results in a fairly stable system. However, the combined impact of counterpart
risk and overlapping portfolio risk results in more cascading bank failures. Simi-
larly, Langfield et al. (2014) provides a comprehensive empirical study of the UK
interbank network using a new dataset containing granular data of exposures in key
markets. They group the markets into two networks i.e. interbank exposures net-
work and interbank funding network, thus allowing for the propagation of credit and
liquidity risk through the system. They show that the network approximates a core-
periphery structure depending on the asset classes. Further, they find as in (Freixas
and Holthausen 2005) that certain core banks can act as fire-stops to contagious
defaults depending on their level of diversification. Their finding lends further cre-
dence to the call for increased capital surcharges for systematically important banks
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required to build more resilience into the system.
A study of the cross-sectional aspects of systemic risk arising from overlapping
portfolios is provided by Kok (2013) using a multi-layered interbank network based
on a sample dataset of 50 large EU banks at the end of 2011. The network captures
three interbank relationships namely the short-term exposures, long term bilateral
exposures having maturities greater than 3-months and a network of common expo-
sures to security portfolios. They show that the feedback impact of an exogenous
shock is substantially much larger than when each network layer is considered in
isolation. In particular, they find that studying an interbank layer in isolation can
lead to serious underestimation of financial contagion. Pickett (2014) extends the
stress test network model to include interbank collateral exposures and an integrated
agent based framework. The agent based model endows banks with behavioural fea-
tures to react to shocks on their balance sheets. Similar to Kok (2013), they show
that combining several layers of interbank exposures can have substantial conse-
quences on the estimation of contagion-induced losses. The paper further provides
a practical framework for conducting stress test and Value at Risk analysis at indi-
vidual bank levels. In a related work, Webber and Willison (2011) adopt a multi-
layered exposures network structure to study the impact of capital requirements on
financial stability using datasets of five major UK banks. They propose a framework
that achieves a policy-maker’s target for the overall system solvency by solving an
optimisation problem to determine the optimal capital requirement for each bank.
They approach encapsulates a structural credit model to capture the evolution of the
banks’ balance sheets. In particular, a bank’s asset evolution is modelled as in (Mer-
ton 1974). The network is cleared using the approach proposed by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) if a bank defaults (i.e. the asset value falls below a predefined default
threshold).
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) conduct an empirical study of the Mexican
financial system network with the goal of investigating systemic risk. They study
the evolution of systemic risk in the payment and interbank exposures network with
traditional network centrality measures and several non-topological properties for
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characterizing individual bank behaviour. They further propose a unified measure
of interconnectedness that can be used to determine systemically relevant nodes
based on principal component analysis. Building on this work, Solorzano-Margain
et al. (2013) have further conducted a study on financial contagion using an ex-
tended dataset of the Mexican exposures network. They show that filling missing
data using the maximum entropy principle typically leads to underestimation of
contagion risk. In the light of this finding, Anand et al. (2015) propose an alterna-
tive method for estimating counterparty exposures. Unlike the maximum entropy
their minimum density approach assigns the largest exposures to the most probable
nodes. As such, contagion is overestimated in their model. However, they show
that combining their method with the maximum entropy principle approximates the
true interbank network better than the existing approach. In a more recent work,
Poledna and Thurner (2016) study the systemic risk contribution due to four layers
of exposures in the Mexican banking system in the 2007-2013 period. In agreement
with previous studies, they show that studying a network layer in isolation results
in severe underestimation of systemic risk. They further show that exposures asso-
ciated with overlapping holdings of securities constitute crucial components in the
estimation of systemic risk on national scales.
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Table 2.1: Literature Summary: Overlapping Portfolios
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Datasets Main Finding
Cifuentes et al.
(2005)
Theoretical - Mark to market accounting rules can result in portfolio of
losses that may trigger a cascade of defaults across the
system
Nier et al. (2007) Theoretical - Overlapping portfolios aggravates the likelihood of a
systemic breakdown of the financial system irrespective of
its average level of connectivity and aggregate capital
Gai and Kapadia
(2010)
Theoretical - Associate overlapping portfolios with a fire sales dynamic
that widens the region within which contagion occurs with
non-zero probability
May and
Arinaminpathy
(2010)
Theoretical - Higher interbank recovery rates aggravates the devastating
impact of overlapping portfolios.
Iori et al. (2006) Theoretical - Interbank network can amplify financial contagion and
increased defaults when banks have heterogeneous liquidity
reserves
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Table 2.1: Literature Summary: Overlapping Portfolios
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Datasets Main Finding
Arinaminpathy
et al. (2012)
Theoretical - Large, well connected banks have non-linear devastating
impact on the stability of a multi-layered financial system
Diamond and Rajan
(2011)
Theoretical - Relationship between asset fire sales and credit freeze-up
during a financial crisis
Caccioli et al.
(2014)
Theoretical - Financial system undergoes two phase transitions of
stability and instability in a multi-asset bipartite financial
network
Huang et al. (2013) Empirical US Commercial banks 2007
balance sheets
Propose a stress test framework for assessing systemic risk
in a bipartite network of banks and assets
Caccioli et al.
(2015)
Empirical Austrian banking system
(2006-08)
Combined impact of counterpart risk and overlapping
portfolio risk results in more cascading bank failures
Langfield et al.
(2014)
Empirical UK interbank data Core banks can act as fire-stops to contagious defaults
depending on their level of diversification
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Table 2.1: Literature Summary: Overlapping Portfolios
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Datasets Main Finding
Kok (2013) Empirical Sample of 50 large EU banks
(last quarter of 2011)
Considering an interbank exposures layer leads to severe
underestimation of financial contagion
Pickett (2014) Empirical FR Y-9C top 10 US banks’
balance sheets
Collaterals backing interbank lendings pose a systemic risk
associated with fire sales and margin calls.
Webber and
Willison (2011)
Empirical Balance sheet data of 5 major
UK banks (2004 H1 - 2009 H1)
Proposed framework for assigning capital requirements to
reduce systemic risk due to network effects
Martinez-Jaramillo
et al. (2014)
Empirical Mexican interbank network:
Daily exposures (03/01/2005 -
31/12/2010)
Characterise systemic relevance of banks in the multi
layered exposures financial network
Solorzano-Margain
et al. (2013)
Empirical Mexican financial system:
monthly exposures
(07/2008-12/2010); daily
exposures (01/2011-08/2011)
Estimating exposure networks based on maximum entropy
principle underestimates financial contagion
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Table 2.1: Literature Summary: Overlapping Portfolios
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Datasets Main Finding
Gabbi et al. (2015) Theoretical Non-monotonic relationship
between banking performance
and degree of connectivity of the
interbank market
Poledna and
Thurner (2016)
Empirical Mexican banking system (2007 -
2013)
Overlapping holdings of securities constitute crucial
components for estimating systemic risk on national scales
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2.2 Risk Diversification
Diversification has been known to reduce the idiosyncratic risk of a financial in-
stitution since the seminar work of Markowitz (1952) on portfolio selection, how-
ever, institutional diversification promotes interconnectedness amongst institutions
which may contribute to the fragility of the system during a crisis. For instance, the
financial system still came close to near collapse even though banks, especially the
big ones, had become largely diversified. This conundrum on the true consequences
of diversification, particularly as it affects the stability of the financial system and
the wider economy has prompted serious discussions from policy makers and aca-
demics in a growing number of studies.
The reports by Wagner (2008) and Wagner (2010) show that diversification in-
creases the likelihood of a systemic crisis due to the homogenization of the financial
system even though it is desirable in terms of reducing the probability of an individ-
ual bank failure. Wagner (2011) further consider a portfolio choice model in which
higher liquidation costs endogenously arise in the event of joint failures. They show
that in equilibrium investors rationally hold portfolios that maximise diversity from
each other and thereby forego diversification benefits in order to avoid the risk asso-
ciated with high joint liquidation cost. In contrast, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005)
and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) suggest that banks undertake similar activities
in order to increase the probability of joint failures in such a manner that increases
their chances of being bailed out by the regulator.
In a related work, Battiston et al. (2012b) investigate under what circumstances
risk diversification increases systemic risk in a stylised financial network of direct
credit linkages. They show that diversification does not necessarily improve the sta-
bility of the financial system even though it reduces individual risk of the financial
institutions. In particular, they find that diversification can serve to amplify sys-
temic risk in the presence of second round feedback mechanisms such as funding
runs by short term lenders. Similarly, Caccioli et al. (2014) study the role of di-
versification on financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios and showed that
the system undergoes two phase transitions with increasing diversification between
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which global cascades can occur. This finding is echoed by Raffestin (2014) using a
theoretical model of financial contagion due to constrained asset sales by portfolio
investors endowed with heuristic behaviours. They show that the optimal diversifi-
cation level can either be none or high but not intermediate since such levels create
inter-linkages between investors without going far enough to reduce their individ-
ual risk. They further show that the financial system becomes more resilient when
investors hold more distant (i.e. uncorrelated) assets. Similarly, Gabbi et al. (2015)
study the impact of various interbank structures on financial stability with an agent
based model. They show that banks’ performance vary in a non-monotonic way
with respect to the degree of connectivity in the interbank network.
Tasca and Battiston (2011) also study the consequences of diversification on
financial stability in a stylised counterparty network of banks partly holding assets
external to the system such as mortgages. Similar to previous findings, they show
that diversification can increase the aggregate risk of the financial system when the
cash flow from the external assets is negative during downturns in the economy,
but this situation is reversed in periods of economic booms. They also investigate
the implications for social costs and show that a regulatory policy that encourages
diversification during upturns in the economy but restricts diversification during
recessions creates socially optimal results. In a recent work, Tasca et al. (2014) also
show that diversification can have ambiguous consequences on the stability of the
financial by studying the joint impact of leverage and diversification on financial
stability using a structural risk model based on the framework proposed by Merton
(1974). In particular, they find that a given leverage value can result in alternating
phases of stability and instability depending on the diversification strategy.
The concept of diversification with its associated risk profiles is also related
to the literature on bank herding since both concepts lead to concentrations in the
same set of activities. Allen and Carletti (2006) and Allen and Gale (2005), for
instance, show that credit risk transfer between the banking and insurance sector
creates portfolio ‘overlaps’ (i.e. inter-linkages) that can increase systemic risk and
have destabilising consequences on the real economy. In their model, risk arises
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because of mark-to-market losses suffered by banks due to the contagious depres-
sion in asset prices - induced by liquidations in the insurance sector during periods
of stress. Furthermore Wagner and Marsh (2006) provides sufficient conditions
for which credit risk transfer between financial institutions with varying degrees of
fragility can reduce stability.
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Table 2.2: Literature Summary: Risk Diversification
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Main Finding
Wagner (2008) Theoretical Homogenization of the financial system increases systemic risk
Wagner (2010) Theoretical Diversification makes individual institutions more stable but
increases the fragility of the financial system
Wagner (2011) Theoretical In equilibrium, investors forgo diversification benefits and hold
maximally diverse portfolios in order to avoid high joint liquidation
cost.
Acharya and Yorulmazer
(2005) and Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2007)
Theoretical In contrast to Wagner (2011) show that banks undertake similar
activities in order to increase the probability of government bail outs.
Iori et al. (2008) Empirical Provide evidence of heterogeneity in the lending relationship of
banks
Battiston et al. (2012b) Theoretical Diversification can amplify systemic risk in the presence of second
round feedback mechanisms such as funding runs
Caccioli et al. (2014) Theoretical Diversification causes phase transitions of stability and instability in
the financial system
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Table 2.2: Literature Summary: Risk Diversification
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Main Finding
Raffestin (2014) Theoretical Financial system becomes more resilient when investors hold more
distant (i.e uncorrelated) assets
Tasca and Battiston (2011) Theoretical Diversification can increase aggregate risk of the financial system
during economic downturns but becomes beneficial during upturns.
Tasca et al. (2014) Theoretical A given leverage value can result in alternating phases of stability
and instability depending on the diversification strategy
Allen and Carletti (2006) and
Allen and Gale (2005)
Theoretical (Credit risk
transfer)
Credit risk transfer between the banking and insurance sector may
increase systemic risk
Wagner and Marsh (2006) Theoretical (Credit risk
transfer)
Provides sufficient conditions for which credit risk transfer between
financial institutions with varying degrees of fragility can reduce
stability
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2.3 Policy Interactions
Central banks use several policies to regulate their financial system with some de-
sired economic impact in perspective. However, combining these policy instru-
ments with the existing regulatory policies could contradict and conflict with the
desired objective of the regulator and may even lead to unintended consequences
on the financial system. As such, addressing this challenge has become imperative
for policy makers.
Unfortunately, these regulatory policies have mostly been studied in isolation
until recently thus bearing the fallacy of composition risk. In particular, the lit-
erature on prudential regulation focused mostly on capital adequacy requirement
CAR has received the widest attention from academia and industry over the last
decade. Cosimano and Hakura (2011), Gauthier et al. (2012), Miles et al. (2013),
Ryo et al. (2010), and Slovik and Courne`de (2011) provide empirical evidence of
a positive impact of the CAR instrument on the economy and the stability of the
financial system while Angelini and Clerc (2011), Boissay (2011), Derviz (2013),
and Dib (2010) have used general equilibrium/ dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium based models to also investigate the qualitative impact of prudential regulation
on the economy and financial stability. A growing number of recent studies have
adopted the use of agent based computation models for economic/financial policy
evaluation.
Aymanns et al. (2016) provide an insightful study of the implications of banks’
leverage management based on historical using an agent based model of a multi-
asset financial system. In their model, banks set their desired leverage target based
on their perceived portfolio risk given by the computed Value-at-Risk (VaR) es-
timate. They show that this leverage management behaviour results in recurring
bubbles and crashes of the stock price – a phenomenon commonly referred to as
”leverage cycles”. An agent based model is also adopted by Poledna et al. (2014) to
study the dynamical feedback of leveraged investors. In their model, the investors
are hedge funds subject to leverage risk management policies. They show that while
Basel II regulation makes the system more stable when leverage is low, the situa-
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tion is reversed when for high leverage. Their results demonstrate the pro-cyclical
impact of Basel II when leverage is high. In particular, they show the destabilis-
ing impact of synchronised buying and selling of assets as a result of deleveraging
actions of highly leveraged agents.
Lengnick (2013) provides a simple agent based model comprising rationally
bounded agents namely households and firms. They show that interaction be-
tween the agents results in the emergence of several stylised facts reported in real
economies such as alternating phases of bubbles and bursts observed in aggregate
production, negative relationship between inflation and unemployment as in Philip’s
curve etc. Their work further provides key insights into the long/short term impact
of the monetary policy of money supply on production and price. The impact of
different mortgage granting policies used by banks is investigated by Erlingsson
et al. (2014a) with an agent based model that not only integrates the real economy
and financial system but also includes the housing market. They show that relaxed
mortgage policies cause the economy to be more prone to recessions due to falling
house prices. The situation becomes even worse with more permissive lending and
leads to more devastating consequences on the economy. They find that this trend
is reversed with stricter policies, specifically they find the economy remains sta-
ble under these conditions. In addition, they show that easier access to credit for
firms leads to increasing house prices as result of the so-called households’ wealth
impact.
Ashraf et al. (2011) also overlay a credit market on top of an agent based model
of the economy in which banks act as lenders to heterogeneous firms. The banks in
their model are constrained by capital ratio requirements imposed by a regulatory
body. Their model shows rare occurrences of destabilising cases emanating from
the banking sector. In particular, they find that the economy is able to recover faster
when the regulatory constraint imposed on banks are more loose. In a similar work,
Cincotti et al. (2010) investigate the impact of lower capital adequacy ratios on
the economy using the EURACE framework (a large-scale agent based platform
targeted at analysing policy designs in Europe). While their results show that short
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run economic output increases with lower capital ratio requirements; they also find
higher number of firm defaults and credit rationing in the long run.
In order to address the question on whether to bail-in, bailout or liquidate a
failed financial institution Klimek et al. (2015) have adopted a simplified version of
the CRISIS agent based framework that integrates the financial system and the real
economy. The resolution policies are compared in terms of their impact on macroe-
conomic variables namely unemployment & GDP as well as on the level of trans-
actions in the financial system. They show that the optimal resolution strategy in
a low interest rate regime (i.e. in an economy characterized by low unemployment
and high productivity) is to liquidate a failed institution while bail-in was shown
to outperform others in a high interest rate regime i.e. for economies characterised
with high unemployment and low GDP.
In the area of fiscal policy design, Dosi et al. (2010) adopt an agent based model
based on Keynesian demand and Schumpeter’s production functions to study the
impact of fiscal policies (including unemployment benefit and tax levels) on GDP
growth and volatility as well as unemployment rate. Though simple, their model is
able to reproduce a number of macroeconomic stylised facts. They find that compli-
mentary functioning of Keynesian and Schumpeterian policies impose a necessary
condition for economic growth. They further extend this model in (Dosi et al. 2013)
to investigate the economic impact of monetary policy i.e. changes in interest rates.
In the extended model, they include banks who act as lenders in the credit market
and are subject to regulatory constraints. They find that monetary policy is only
effective when income distribution is low otherwise it becomes ineffective. A par-
allel work in this area by Cincotti et al. (2010) study the joint impact of a central
bank’s quantitative easing (QE) policy and the fiscal policy using an extension of
EURACE framework. They show that the economy performs better as a result of
more effective QE and fiscal policy, but long-run output volatility and inflation be-
come substantially higher.
A recent trend of research work attempt to understand the interaction of alter-
native macroprudential tools and monetary policy. Agenor et al. (2013) employ a
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DSGE model endowed with imperfect credit markets to study the joint impact of
capital requirements and monetary policy on economic and financial stability. They
show that combining Basel III and a monetary policy that adapts to te credit gap as
well as inflation deviations promotes economic stability. Angeloni and Faia (2013)
also study the impact of the interplay between monetary policy and capital regula-
tions on financial risk. They analysis reveals that a combination of counter-cyclical
Basel III capital requirements and a leverage/asset prices augmented monetary rule
provides the best results. Similar findings are reported by Napoletano et al. (2015),
who extend the agent based model proposed by Ashraf et al. (2011) in order to study
the joint impact of alternative prudential regulation and various monetary policies
on the macroeconomy and financial system. They show that a combination of Basel
III and a monetary policy that considers inflation, unemployment and credit volume
is the most beneficial for the economy and the financial system. Further, they show
that the inclusion of the leverage component is non-addictive with the performance
of the Basel III framework. In a related study, Suh (2014) compare the impact of
macroprudential regulation against monetary policy. They show that monetary pol-
icy has the effect of stabilising inflation but not credit while macroprudential policy
stabilises credit, but it is not effective for inflation. The findings reported in these
papers share commonality with those reported by Angelini et al. (2012), Beau et al.
(2012), and Spencer (2014).
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Table 2.3: Literature Summary: Policy Interactions
Authors
Analytical
Framework
Regulatory
Policies
Main Finding
Cosimano and Hakura
(2011), Gauthier et al.
(2012), Miles et al.
(2013), Ryo et al. (2010),
and Slovik and Courne`de
(2011)
Empirical Capital adequacy
requirement (CAR)
CAR improves the resilience of the financial system and
positively impacts the real economy
Angelini and Clerc (2011),
Boissay (2011), Derviz
(2013), and Dib (2010)
Theoretical
(DSGE)
Capital adequacy
requirement (CAR)
Provide qualitative impact of macroprudential regulation on
financial stability
Ashraf et al. (2011) Theoretical
(ABM)
Capital adequacy
requirement (CAR)
Economy recovers faster when the regulatory constraint
imposed on banks are more loose
Cincotti et al. (2010) Theoretical
(ABM)
Capital adequacy
requirement (CAR)
Lower capital requirement improves economic output in the
short run but also increases credit rationing and firm defaults
Aymanns et al. (2016) Theoretical
(ABM)
Basel II (Leverage
requirement)
Leverage management behaviour results in recurring
bubbles and crashes of the stock price
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Authors
Analytical
Framework
Regulatory
Policies
Main Finding
Poledna et al. (2014) Theoretical
(ABM)
Basel II (Leverage
requirement)
Basel II is pro-cyclical
Lengnick (2013) Theoretical
(ABM)
Monetary policy Provides key insights into the long/short term impact of the
monetary policy of money supply on production and price
Dosi et al. (2013) Theoretical
(ABM)
Monetary policy Monetary policy is only effective when income distribution
is low otherwise it becomes ineffective
Erlingsson et al. (2014a) Theoretical
(ABM)
Mortgage granting policy Relaxed mortgage policies causes the economy to be more
prone to recessions due to falling house prices
Klimek et al. (2015) Theoretical
(ABM)
Bankruptcy resolution
policy
Bail in is more beneficial in a high interest rate regime but
purchase and assumption performs better when interest rates
are low
Dosi et al. (2010) Theoretical
(ABM)
Fiscal policy Complimentary functioning of Keynesian and
Schumpeterian policies impose a necessary condition for
economic growth
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Authors
Analytical
Framework
Regulatory
Policies
Main Finding
Cincotti et al. (2010) Theoretical
(ABM)
Fiscal policy and
quantitative easing (QE)
Economy performs better because of more effective QE and
fiscal policy but long-run output volatility and inflation
become substantially higher.
Agenor et al. (2013) and
Angeloni and Faia (2013)
Theoretical
(DSGE)
Basel III (CAR) and
monetary policy
Combining Basel III and a monetary policy that adapts to te
credit gap as well as inflation deviations promotes economic
stability
Napoletano et al. (2015) Theoretical
(ABM)
Monetary policy and
macroprudential
regulations
Combining Basel III with a monetary policy that considers
inflation, unemployment and credit volume is the most
beneficial for the economy and the financial system
Angelini et al. (2012) and
Suh (2014)
Theoretical
(DSGE)
Monetary policy and
macroprudential
regulations
Monetary policy has the effect of stabilising inflation but not
credit while macroprudential policy stabilises credit but it is
not effective for inflation
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Authors
Analytical
Framework
Regulatory
Policies
Main Finding
Beau et al. (2012) and
Spencer (2014)
Empirical
(Discussion)
Monetary policy and
macroprudential
regulations
Joint coordination of monetary and macroprudential policies
could create complexities and result in unintended
consequences
Chapter 3
Methodology: An Overview
For decades, the ”science” of setting economic and financial policy has been based
on neoclassical models grounded on the theoretical framework of traditional eco-
nomic paradigm. The bitter experience of the crisis, however, exposed the limitation
of these models in characterising non-linear feedback and economic downturns as-
sociated with systemic risk. In fact, these models failed to predict the occurrence of
the crisis and also left policy makers clueless on what policies to implement in-order
to guide the economy out of recession (Krugman 2011; Stiglitz 2011).
As such, there is a growing consensus for a complete paradigm shift from the
existing frameworks to models that treat the economy as a complex evolving system
(Farmer and Foley 2009; Tesfatsion 2005). Trichet (2011) noted how ”the combina-
tion of complexity, interconnectedness, payments promises in debt contracts, limits
of information and basic human behaviour - animal spirits” lead to the build-up of
systemic vulnerabilities. In the following sections, I elaborate on the limitations of
traditional economic models and provide a concise overview of the methods used
in this thesis namely agent-based and network models.
3.1 Limitations of Traditional Models
In this section, I discuss the inherent limitations of traditional economic models
for understanding the dynamics underlying the emergence of systemic risk and
designing mitigating macroeconomic policies. Traditional economic models are
typically based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) methodology.
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DSGE models typically consist of representative agents making rational decisions
by optimizing an objective function. Such models are occasionally perturbed by
random exogenous shocks in-order to simulate the stochastic evolution of the real
economy.
At the core of a DSGE model is a representative household that determines its
demand for produced goods by optimizing a utility function subject to constraints,
a representative firm that aggregates goods produced by a set of firms - where the
supply of goods is determined by a given production function, an equilibrium price
vector that ensures market clearing and a regulatory agency that controls the mon-
etary policy of the economy (i.e. interest rates). Essentially, the implementation of
DSGE models for policy making follows a top-down approach that involves solv-
ing a system of two finite difference equations in three unknowns namely targets
for GDP, inflation and nominal interest rates. The aggregate system’s output is then
observed under different policy scenarios subject to the same exogenous shocks.
A major criticism targeted at DSGE models is the way macro phenomena are
generated. In these models, the output is either obtained by using a representative
agent or aggregating over a set of homogeneous rational agents. However, studies
in other disciplines have shown emergent macro phenomena having little or no re-
lation to the individual agents’ micro-behaviour. Schelling (1969) presents a clear
example in the ”social interaction paradox”. This work demonstrates how the inter-
action of agents with only weak preferences for living in communities with similar
agents results in extreme segregation often observed in the real world. A similar sit-
uation is observed by Reynolds (1987) in the ”Birds in a flight paradox”. Here, the
systematic movement of a flock of birds is shown to emanate from the actions of in-
dividual bird interacting with other birds. Drawing from such case studies, several
critics have noted that macro phenomena should also endogenously emerge from
the dynamics of economic models in contrast to aggregated properties (Colander
et al. 2009; Delli Gatti et al. 2010; Kirman 2010).
Another area where these models have come under severe criticism is the unre-
alistic assumption of extreme rationality. It is assumed that agents are endowed with
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infinite processing powers that enable them to ex-ante form rational expectations -
requiring precise anticipation of the actions of other agents. The demands this as-
sumption places on the agents is not only unrealistic but also time consuming. In
fact, the very notion of agents rationally optimising a utility function has come un-
der severe criticism since the emergence of behavioural economics (see Kahneman
and Tversky 1984).
As the name suggest, DSGE models are simply stochastic flavours of neoclas-
sical equilibrium models. As such, they suffer from the same limiting assumption
of general equilibrium namely ”existence of fixed points”. In an equilibrium model,
the market is always cleared by a price vector that is calculated by a fictitious ”Wal-
rasian auctioneer” before transactions take place. However, the reverse is observed
in real markets where the transactions and interactions of agents results in price
formation (i.e. price is not a precondition). Moreover, it has been shown that gen-
eral adjustment processes under which an economy returns to its original equilib-
rium state when perturbed may not necessarily exist (Ackerman 2002; Gaffeo et al.
2008). Similarly, Arthur (2006) has demonstrated the possibility of the occurrence
of multiple equilibria, instability and chaos.
Although the aforementioned assumptions of rationality, representative agents
and existence of equilibrium points facilitate tractability of a DSGE model. They,
however, limit its use for modelling the emergence of unforeseen macro phenom-
ena from interactions in an evolving complex system such as the occurrence of a
financial crisis. Some critiques have even argued that the very notion of a crisis
and the use of representative agents, equilibrium and assumption of rationality is
by nature contradictory (Farmer and Foley 2009). Robert Solow succinctly sum-
marises this in his remarks at the US Congress hearing ”...I do not think that the
currently popular DSGE models pass the smell test. They take it for granted that
the whole economy can be thought about as if it were a single, consistent person or
dynasty carrying out a rationally designed, long-term plan, occasionally disturbed
by unexpected shocks, but adapting to them in a rational, consistent way... The pro-
tagonists of this idea make a claim to respectability by asserting that it is founded
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on what we know about microeconomic behaviour, but I think that this claim is gen-
erally phony. The advocates no doubt believe what they say, but they seem to have
stopped sniffing or to have lost their sense of smell altogether...” (Solow 2010).
3.2 Alternative Models
In the previous section, I showed that the top-down analytic approach employed in
existing economic models requires over-simplified assumptions of rationality, rep-
resentative agents and existence of equilibrium points which limits their use for de-
signing regulatory policies. I overcome these limitations by employing agent based
and network dynamics modelling techniques. An overview of these methods is pro-
vided in the following sections while specific implementation details are presented
within the context subsequent chapters.
3.2.1 Agent based modelling
Agent based modelling facilitates the simulation of the economy as a complex
evolving system. Agent based models belong to the class of Agent-based finan-
cial economics (ACE). ACE has emerged over the last two decades as a viable
alternative for overcoming the limitations of existing economic models (see Fagi-
olo et al. 2007; Tesfatsion 2005, for a more detailed discussion on ACE). Agent
based models are simply bottom-up frameworks that capture complex interactions
of rationally bounded heterogeneous agents reacting and adapting to changing en-
vironmental condition in an evolving system lacking central coordination.
The complex interactions result in the emergence of unforeseen phenomena
at the macro level such as a financial crisis rather than specifying such conditions
ex-ante or simply aggregating over individual agents. Trichet (2010), for instance,
advocates for agent based approaches as suitable alternatives to replace existing
models in his remark that ”The atomistic, optimising agents underlying existing
models do not capture behaviour during a crisis period. We need to deal better
with heterogeneity across agents and the interaction among those heterogeneous
agents. We need to entertain alternative motivations for economic choices...Agent-
based modelling dispenses with the optimisation assumption and allows for more
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complex interactions between agents. Such approaches are worthy of our attention”.
In the following paragraphs, I briefly distinct features characterising agent based
frameworks that make them suitable for building economic and financial policy
models:
First, agents can be separately endowed with different decision rules/heuristics
in-order to facilitate heterogeneity. As such, agents are not necessarily pursuing the
same objective. In fact, heterogeneity of the agents makes it possible to avoid the
over simplifying assumption of representative agents in DSGE models. Moreover,
agents are not endowed with super cognitive abilities that can enable them make
decisions based on a complete knowledge of the entire complex system as assumed
in a DSGE model. Rather, these decisions are heuristically driven from interactions
in their local environments. In a sense, agents can only follow myopic optimisation
rules as observed in the real world.
Furthermore, agents can adapt their behaviour to suit the demands of their con-
stantly evolving environment. This by its very nature is at the heart of the evolution
of the system resulting in a so-called ”complex adaptive system”. Due to constant
behavioural adaptation, the evolving system of an agent based model can display
macro-properties decoupled from individual behavioural characteristics. The abil-
ity to generate unforeseen emergent phenomena is one of the major strengths of an
agent based model. For instance, the emergence of macro-patterns resulting from
complex interactions of individual car drivers has been used by Geroliminis and
Sun (2011) to explain the ”phantom traffic jam” phenomenon.
Unlike their top-down DSGE counterparts, agent based models are built from
blocks of individual agents incorporating realistic micro-foundations. The complex
non-centrally coordinated interactions of these entities result in the emergence of
macro-phenomena rather than them being imposed on the system ex-ante. Finally,
the interactions in an agent based model can be non-linear as the system is not
required to be mathematical tractable as in DSGE models. Hence, non-linearities in
agents’ interactions and in the feedback loops between macro and micro properties
are easily captured in an agent based model.
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The features identified in the preceding paragraphs make an agent based model
an ideal tool for studying the causes and consequences financial crisis associated
with systemic risk as well as designing effective mitigating economic and financial
policies. The general framework for achieving such a task with an agent based
model is briefly summarised below.
1. The process begins by defining the population set of agents required to ad-
dress the policy question being investigated. For economic and financial pol-
icy questions, these agents would typically include firms, banks, households
etc.
2. Agents are endowed with decision rules that enable them make heuristic
choices given the limited information they obtain from their local environ-
ment. A finite number of micro/macro-economic variables and fixed parame-
ters are used to characterize the behaviour of each agent.
3. Initial conditions are specified for each variable and parameter based on em-
pirical observation of relevant real-world features.
4. The system is then allowed to evolve over a specified time period. The time
steps are chosen to capture the time-scales of the real-world activity being
modelled and can be in days, months, quarters, years etc. Each time step is
seeded with the new environment variables resulting from the interactions in
the previous time step.
5. The statistical properties of relevant emergent macro phenomena such as
GDP, unemployment rate etc. are observed. These statistical properties are
directly linked to the parameters used to initialise the system. Therefore, it
is possible to think of agent based models as data generating processes of
alternative worlds.
3.2.2 Network dynamics modelling
Financial institutions are intertwined due to dependencies arising from the asset and
the liability side of their balance sheets. The 2007 financial crisis in which problems
3.2. Alternative Models 49
originating from the US subprime mortgage market rapidly spread to global finan-
cial markets revealed the significance of understanding the consequences of this
interconnectedness (Crouhy et al. 2008). Fortunately, network modelling provides
an intuitive way of representing and analysing these linkages between financial in-
stitutions. A network simply refers to a collection of points (nodes) paired together
with lines (edges) (Newman 2010). Over the last years, many systems in varied
fields have been represented and studied as networks including computer, social
and biological networks. Consequently, an interdisciplinary field known as network
theory has emerged that combines extensive set of scientific tools and techniques
developed by drawing from such fields as physics, mathematics, statistics, biology
etc.
In the context of financial systems; a network may be used to represent direct
connections resulting from inter-institutional lending between financial institutions
(e.g. interbank and repo transactions) or indirect connections due to similar asset
investments such as linkages arising from overlapping portfolios. A node in a finan-
cial network will typically represent a financial institution or an asset while an edge
may represent exposure to another institution in the case of direct connections or
exposure to an asset in the case of indirect connections. Network theory provides a
set of mathematical models such as random graphs, preferential-attachment, small
world model for constructing patterns observed in real networks. This feature pro-
vides a convenient approach to study the implications of different network structures
on the resilience of the financial system to external shocks as in (Albert et al. 2002;
Allen and Gale 2000). Further, network theory also provides a set of tools for de-
scribing and analysing networks such as centrality measures and metrics. These
techniques can be readily used in analysing static financial networks such as com-
puting the degree centrality of financial institutions or checking for the present of
hubs (i.e. highly connected institutions) in the systems. Finally, observed histori-
cal relationships tend to breakdown during a crisis. For instance, assets correlation
and volatilities change in unanticipated ways in the event of a crisis. As such, it is
mandatory for regulatory risk management models to be reactive and adaptable to
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changing environmental conditions. Network theory solves this challenge by pro-
viding theoretical frameworks for modelling the dynamics of a system as processes
on networks such as percolation or epidemics on networks (Noh 2007). Leverag-
ing on these frameworks makes it possible to design regulatory models that con-
sider the vulnerability of the entire financial system to negative externalities such
as the sudden failure of a bank or depreciation of an asset’s value. Analysing a
financial network generally involves initialising a model with nodes i.e. financial
institutions and generating a network structure between the nodes empirically or
theoretically. The network is then subjected to exogenous shocks which can in-
volve shutting down one or more nodes (i.e. financial institutions) or perturbing the
value of one or more assets and allowing the nodes react to these shocks subject
to pre-specified regulatory constraints over a certain period. These processes are
conceptualised in Figure 3.1. In Chapter 4, I provide a framework that concisely
implements this approach.
Figure 3.1: Analysing a financial network
Chapter 4
Overlapping portfolios
4.1 Introduction
Financial institutions are increasingly diversifying their balance sheet across several
asset classes in-order to reduce the idiosyncratic component of their portfolio risk.
This has led to increased global connectivity in the portfolio holdings across several
institutions (Battiston et al. 2012b; Josselin Garnier et al. 2013). However, recent
studies including (Arinaminpathy et al. 2012; Caccioli et al. 2011; Caccioli et al.
2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010; May and Arinaminpathy 2010; Nier et al. 2007) have
shown that while increased interconnectivity can help diversify risk across the sys-
tem, it also serves as a contagion propagating and amplification mechanism when-
ever a crisis is underway. This was partly the reason American International Group
(AIG) was bailed out during the financial crisis as many of the biggest financial
institutions had become exposed to it via derivative contracts (Scott 2012, provides
more details). Financial institutions are connected directly via inter-institutional
lending (e.g. interbank and repo transactions) and also indirectly through similar
asset investments such as connections arising from overlapping portfolios. While
the former has drawn the most attention from studies focusing on the role of coun-
terparty and roll-over risks in propagating contagion (Arinaminpathy et al. 2012;
Battiston et al. 2012a; Caccioli et al. 2011; Gai and Kapadia 2010; Gai et al. 2011;
Iori et al. 2006; May and Arinaminpathy 2010), academics and policymakers have
only recently begun paying close attention to the systemic risk posed by indirect
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connections associated with overlapping portfolios (Caccioli et al. 2014; Huang et
al. 2013).
These connections provide a contagion channel for the propagation of mark-
to-market portfolio losses to one or more financial institutions due to depression
in asset prices resulting from fire sales by a distressed institution holding the same
assets. In some cases, these losses may be sufficient to cause additional institutions
to become distressed thereby resulting in more rounds of asset fire sales and further
depression in asset prices. The 2007 quant crisis, for instance, was caused by a sim-
ilar scenario in which the fire sales liquidation of the portfolio of one equity hedge
fund depressed prices of assets held by other funds causing them to embark on ad-
ditional rounds of selling which depressed asset prices even further and resulted in
large portfolio losses (see Khandani and Lo 2007, for an elaborate discussion). The
existing literature on overlapping portfolios have only considered bank interlink-
ages arising from a single asset class (Arinaminpathy et al. 2012; Cifuentes et al.
2005; Gai and Kapadia 2010; Nier et al. 2007). However, Caccioli et al. (2014)
have recently generalised the fire sales model introduced in (Cifuentes et al. 2005)
to the case of many assets. They characterised the stability of the financial sys-
tem in terms of its structural properties including average degree, market crowding,
leverage and market impact using a bipartite financial network model in which the
contagion channel is formed through local portfolio overlaps between banks with
homogeneous degrees.
However, their approach relies on the assumption of homogeneity in the de-
grees and sizes of all banks which may not necessarily be the case. In fact recent
empirical studies (Braverman and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Iori et al. 2008;
Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012) show that real financial networks of
common portfolio holdings and balance sheet size distributions deviate from this
assumption. Specifically, they provide evidence of a power law in these distribu-
tions. Following these findings, I generalise the approach in (Caccioli et al. 2014)
to account for power law in the degrees and sizes of banks. I refer to banks with
low degrees as specialised while those with high degrees are said to be diversified.
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In this way, we can distinguish between the systemic risk contribution of different
categories of banks ranging from very specialised to very diversified banks. Further-
more, I studied the effectiveness of various regulatory capital policy models guided
by the intuition developed from the systemic risk contribution of the different types
of banks. I then investigated the possibility of improving the system’s stability by
introducing structural correlation into the network without imposing new capital re-
quirements. Finally, I characterise the stability response of the system with respect
to leverage.
The model used for our simulations belongs to the same class of contagion
mechanisms used extensively in the literature of counterparty network models (Gai
and Kapadia 2010; Nier et al. 2007; Upper 2011). In a nutshell, the system is
exogenously perturbed, and the resulting impact is recursively propagated through
the network until no new default is observed. This feedback mechanism is essen-
tially driven by asset devaluations based on a market impact function that revalues
an asset with respect to its traded volume (Bouchaud and Cont 1998; Bouchaud
et al. 2009). Our goal is to understand the impact of heterogeneity in the portfolio
structure of banks on financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios. As such,
I abstract from strategic processes used by banks in choosing a particular portfo-
lio structure as in (Wagner 2011), who show using a micro-founded model that in
equilibrium the risk of joint liquidation motivates investors towards heterogeneous
portfolio configurations. Moreover, the mechanistic approach I consider keeps the
model general enough for stress testing real financial systems by calibrating the
model. I further assume passive portfolio management to keep the dynamics simple
(i.e. banks do not deleverage or rebalance their portfolios during a crisis). In this
sense, a bank’s portfolio remains fixed until it becomes liquidated whenever it de-
faults. This assumption can be justified from the fact that most financial markets are
illiquid relative to the positions held by large institutions such that whenever a crisis
is underway, banks usually have insufficient time to deleverage until they become
insolvent (see Caccioli et al. 2014, for an elaborate discussion).
Our stress tests reveal that heterogeneous bank degrees and sizes make the
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system more unstable relative to the homogeneous benchmark case with respect to
random shocks but not with respect to targeted shocks. In contrast, heterogeneity in
asset concentrations makes the system more resilient to random shocks but not with
respect to targeted shocks. I then proceeded to study possible capital policy models
guided by these results and find that a regulatory policy that assigns capital to the
most specialised banks performs better than random assignments when the average
degree is high. Moreover, diversification is a more significant factor than size in
improving the financial system’s resilience with capital based policies. The insights
I develop can be used to address one of the major drawbacks of the Basel accords
in ignoring the role of diversification for setting capital requirements (Committee
of European Banking Supervisors 2010). An example is the risk weighted capital
requirement framework which is heavily criticised for providing banks with incen-
tives to concentrate in low risk asset classes such as interbank loans, sovereign debt
etc. which not surprisingly turned out to be at the centre of the 2007 financial crisis
(Wagner et al. 2012). Finally, I investigated the possibility of improving financial
stability with a non-capital based policy that imposes a particular configuration in
the bipartite network and find that disassortative mixing (i.e. connecting the most
specialised banks with the most concentrated assets) increases the stability of the
system.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I outline the
main features of the model. In Section 4.3, I explore the stability impact of hetero-
geneous network topology and balance sheet sizes. Section 4.4 provides insights on
the effectiveness of capital based policies and proposes a non-capital based policy
by introducing structural correlations into the bipartite network. In Section 4.5, I
study the impact of leverage on our model. Finally, a summary of our findings is
presented in Section 4.6.
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Network
As in (Caccioli et al. 2014), I consider a bipartite network of a financial system
consisting of N banks and M assets as shown in Figure 4.1. A link from bank i to
asset j implies that j constitutes part of the portfolio of bank i. I define ki as the
degree (i.e. the total number of links) of bank i. Hence, the average bank degree is
defined as:
µb =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ki (4.1)
Similarly, we can define the average degree of the assets as:
µa =
1
M
M
∑
j=1
li (4.2)
Where, l j is the number of banks holding asset j in their portfolio. It is the case
that the number of links emanating from both sides of the bipartite network must be
equal i.e. µbN = µaM. Thus, I have that µb = µa whenever N = M.
(a) Heterogeneous bipartite network (b) One-mode projection of banks
Figure 4.1: Left Panel: A Heterogeneous bipartite financial network. Banks are
depicted in red circles while Assets are shown in blue. Right Panel: One-mode
projection of the network to show indirect connections between banks.
4.2.2 Balance sheet structure
A typical bank’s portfolio in the network discussed above consist of investments in
non-liquid assets (e.g. shares in stocks) and liquid assets (e.g. cash). Figure 4.2 de-
picts the general structure of a bank’s balance sheet. I have defined a bank’s propor-
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Figure 4.2: A typical bank’s balance sheet structure. The bank holds a fixed amount
of its asset in the form of cash, which value is assumed to remain fixed throughout
the simulation for simplicity.
tion of liquid assets and initial capital as 20% and 4% of its total assets respectively
for consistency with previous work (Caccioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010).
Moreover, reports in (Upper 2011) suggest that the capital structure of banks in
advanced economies typically conforms with this configuration. I define the total
asset of bank i at any time t is defined as:
Ati =
M
∑
j=1
Qi j ptj +Ci (4.3)
Where Qi j denotes the number of shares of stock j held by bank i, ptj is the price of
stock j at time t defined as:
ptj = p
t−1
j f j(x
t
j) (4.4)
Where xtj denotes the quantity of asset j sold at time t The capital (equity) of bank
i at time t is given as:
Eti = A
t
i−Di (4.5)
In the model, a bank is declared insolvent whenever its initial capital endowment
E0i is completely eroded due to losses incurred from the depreciation of its asset
values. Hence, I define the solvency condition for a bank i as:
A0i −
M
∑
j=1
Qi j ptj−Ci ≤ E0i (4.6)
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We can also express the solvency condition for bank i as a condition on its initial
leverage defined as λi = A0i /E
0
i i.e.
λi ≤
∑Mj=1 Qi j ptj +Ci
E0i
+1 (4.7)
Hence, leverage is a necessary condition for a bank to fail since an unleveraged
bank i.e. (λi = 1) would always satisfy Equation 4.6.
4.2.3 Contagion mechanism
A typical simulation in our model follows the sequence enumerated below:
Step 1. Exogenously shock the system at time step t = 0
Step 2. Check banks for solvency condition as in Equation 4.7 at each successive
time steps t = 1,2, ..
Step 3. Liquidate the portfolios of any newly bankrupt banks and re-compute asset
prices 1
Step 4. Terminate the simulation when no new default(s) occurs between succes-
sive time steps.
This dynamics is captured by the flowchart depicted in Figure 4.3
Any new
defaults?
Exogeneous
Shock
Liquidate portfolios &
recompute assets' prices
Check for new
insolvent banks
Terminate
Yes
No
Figure 4.3: Flowchart representation of the contagion mechanism. A Bank is only
declared bankrupt whenever it becomes insolvent.
4.2.3.1 Exogenous shocks
I consider two kinds of initial shocks: random and targeted shocks. In a random
shock, a bank or asset is randomly selected and exogenously perturbed while a
specific kind of bank or asset is perturbed in the case of a targeted shock.
1In order to keep the model simple, I assume that the liquidated assets are traded with parties
outside the banking system.
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4.2.3.2 Market impact
I assume a market impact function of the form f j(x j) = e−αx j as in (Arinaminpathy
et al. 2012; Cifuentes et al. 2005; Gai and Kapadia 2010) such that x j is the liqui-
dated fraction of asset j. The price of asset j is then updated according to the rule:
p j→ p j f j(x j). As in (Caccioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010; Nier et al. 2007),
I set α = 1.0536 such that the liquidation of 10% of an asset results in a 10% price
drop in the asset’s value.
4.2.3.3 Systemic stability
I characterise the stability of the financial system in terms of the systemic risk posed
by an exogenous shock. I define systemic risk as the probability that contagion
occurs. In the context of our model, contagion is said to occur only when the number
of cascading defaults resulting from an exogenous shock exceeds a critical threshold
φ . I define φ as 5% of the total number of banks in the system for consistency with
previous work on financial contagion (Caccioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010).
4.3 Stability Analysis
The existing literature on financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios have
only considered banks with homogeneous (i.e. similar) degrees and sizes (see Cac-
cioli et al. 2014; Cifuentes et al. 2005), for instance, (Caccioli et al. 2014) consider a
homogeneous financial network using an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi bipartite networks. However
recent empirical studies by (Braverman and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Marotta
et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012) have shown that real portfolio networks are far
removed from such distributions. In particular, they show the existence of a power
law in the degree distributions in a network of overlapping portfolios similar to the
observations reported in (Boss et al. 2004; Caccioli et al. 2015) for counterparty
networks.
4.3.1 Heterogeneous bank degrees
In this chapter, I investigate the stability impact of heterogeneity in the degree of
banks. As such, I consider a heterogeneous bipartite financial networks where the
degrees of banks are generated according to a power law distribution i.e. P(k)∝ k−γ
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with γ = 2.5. Each bank then forms a link with a random asset until it reaches its
generated degree such that no bank is linked to an asset more than once. This link
formation approach implies that the number of links of the assets follows a Poisson
distribution since every asset has the same probability of being selected. A bank’s
degree can be interpreted as its level of diversification since it denotes the number of
different investments of the bank. I have used the term specialised bank to mean a
bank with focused investments in contrast to a bank holding a diversified portfolio.
Our focus here lies in understanding the systemic risk contribution of different types
of banks ranging from very specialised to very diversified banks without mixing in
the influence of size. This approach mandates an assumption of the same balance
sheet sizes across all banks.
In the left panel of Figure 4.4, I plot the probability of contagion as a func-
tion of µb when a random bank fails. I compare the unstable region for the system
with heterogeneous bank degrees relative to the homogeneous case. We find that
the unstable region is wider in the heterogeneous system. The right panel of Fig-
ure 4.4 shows that this observation is independent of the kind of exogenous shock.
In particular, I plot the contagion probability for the case when an asset is randomly
devalued and still find that heterogeneity in banks’ degree results in greater insta-
bility. The existence of a wider unstable region in the heterogeneous system can be
understood by observing that contrary to the homogeneous case, the heterogeneous
system is characterized by a few highly diversified banks and many specialized
banks. Hence, the probability that a specialized bank is hit from the initial shock
is relatively higher. Consequently, specialised banks induce higher devaluations on
their assets since they hold large amounts of these assets.
However, this result contrasts with general reports in the complex networks
literature in which heterogeneous network topology has been shown to create more
stability, for instance, Caccioli et al. (2011) show that heterogeneity in a counter-
party network creates a more robust system relative to the homogeneous case. The
reason for this lies in the fact these previous works have considered a network of
direct bilateral exposures between the heterogeneous agents such that the few hubs
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Figure 4.4: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for the case when
a random bank fails. Red circles: system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Blue
squares: system with homogeneous bank degrees. Right Panel: Contagion proba-
bility as a function of µb for the case when a random asset is devalued. Contagion
is worse in the heterogeneous system irrespective of the kind of exogenous shock.
Result refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
(i.e. the most connected) nodes become the most systemically relevant whereas the
specialised nodes are the most systemically relevant in this case since they concen-
trate their investments in specific assets and thereby carry higher liquidation risk.
This result sheds some light to why specialised institutions like mortgage banks,
building and loan associations, specialist funds etc. who hold significant amounts of
specific assets should be considered systemically important as the fire sales of these
assets conditional on their default may have devastating impacts on asset prices.
Moreover, this finding provides further credence to the conjecture given by Andrew
Haldane, the Bank of England’s Chief Economist, in one his speeches that the ”rapid
growth in specialist funds potentially carry risk implications, both for end-investors
and for the financial system as a whole” (Haldane 2014). Furthermore, Wagner
(2011) also suggests imposing higher diversity requirements on portfolio holdings
of financial institutions with high liquidation risk relative to those with low risk.
In Figure 4.5, I show the impact of targeted shocks on the stability of the sys-
tem. I plot the probability of contagion as a function of µb when the initial shock is
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aimed at specific banks. We find that the unstable region is widest when any of the
top 5% most specialised banks is hit while targeted shocks on any of the top 5% di-
versified banks results in the smallest unstable region. This can be understood from
the fact that banks hold lesser amounts of specific assets with increasing degrees
since I assume here that all banks are endowed with the same asset sizes. Hence,
targeting shocks at the most diversified banks would effectively close the fire-sale
contagion channel quicker since only small amounts of assets would be sold, which
implies lower price devaluation than the case when banks are randomly perturbed.
However, the reverse is observed when shocks are directed at the most specialised
banks since they hold significant amounts of specific assets and thereby carry higher
liquidation risk. I refer to these banks as ”Too Specialised To Fail” (TSTF).
0 5 10 15
µb
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Co
nt
ag
io
n 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Figure 4.5: Contagion probability as a function of µb when banks have hetero-
geneous degrees. Blue squares: contagion probability when a random bank fails.
Green diamonds: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the most spe-
cialised banks. Red circles: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at only
the most diversified banks. The region where contagion occurs is widest when spe-
cialised banks are targeted. Result refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000
4.3.2 Heterogeneous asset concentration
In the previous section, I introduced heterogeneity into the distribution of the banks’
degrees and the number of banks holding each asset is homogeneous. In this sec-
tion, I turn our attention to the case when the distribution of the number of banks
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holding each asset class is heterogeneous and the degree distribution of banks is ho-
mogeneous. I follow the approach of the previous section and assume a power law
distribution in the asset concentrations. An asset’s concentration can be interpreted
as the preference of banks towards that asset class. Our aim is to study how this
preference structure affects the stability of the entire system.
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Figure 4.6: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µa for homogeneous
and heterogeneous distributions of asset concentrations. Blue squares: system with
homogeneous asset concentrations. Red circles: system with heterogeneous as-
set concentrations. A random bank fails in both cases. Introducing heterogeneity
into the distribution of asset concentrations results in a more robust system. Right
Panel: Targeted shocks on a system with heterogeneous asset concentrations. Tar-
geting concentrated assets amplifies contagion probability. Result refer to 1000
simulations for N = M = 1000
In the left panel of Figure 4.6, I plot the probability of contagion as a function
of average asset concentration for the case when a random bank fails. In contrast to
the results observed for heterogeneous bank degrees, we find that introducing het-
erogeneity in the concentration of the assets produces a more robust system relative
to the homogeneous system. This can be understood from the fact that the proba-
bility than a highly concentrated asset is perturbed is relatively low since the scale
free network comprises very few concentrated assets and many less concentrated
(i.e. isolated) ones. This effectively reduces the unstable region since fewer banks
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are affected by contagion.
The right panel of Figure 4.6 shows the stability impact of aiming initial shocks
at any of the top 5% most concentrated assets. As expected, targeting initial shocks
at these highly concentrated assets has the effect of amplifying contagion since more
banks’ portfolios are negatively affected by the initial asset devaluation. However,
the width of the unstable region is essentially the same as in the homogeneous sys-
tem. This is so because as soon as banks reach a critical average degree they become
resilient to contagion irrespective of the kind of shock on the asset side.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous bank sizes
In the previous sections, I assumed that all banks have the same balance sheet sizes
in order to separate the influence of size from diversification. However, empirical
evidence in the literature clearly suggest that banks also have largely heterogeneous
sizes (Boss et al. 2004). For instance, a recent data analysis by SNL Financial
shows that the top 5 biggest banks have 44% of the total assets held by banks in
the U.S. (Schaefer 2014). Our aim in this section is to study the impact of this kind
of heterogeneity in the size distribution of banks on the stability of the financial
system. To do this, I model the bank sizes according to a power law distribution
i.e. P(A) ∝ A−γ resulting in the creation of a few banks with significantly larger
asset sizes than most banks whilst abstracting from the influence of diversification
by assuming a Poisson degree distribution.
In the left panel of Figure 4.8, I plot the probability of contagion as a function
of µb for the case of random bank shocks. We find that contagion halts much faster
when banks have homogeneous sizes relative to the heterogeneous case. The fol-
lowing argument provides an intuition to why this is the case. In the heterogeneous
system, the fire sales impact on asset prices is more severe whenever any of the large
banks are hit as these banks hold significant amounts of their assets relative to the
entire system since I have assumed a Poisson degree distribution. This effectively
shifts the critical threshold for which contagion is no longer possible to the right.
The right panel shows the contagion probability as a function of µb for the case
of initial shocks to specific banks. We observe that the system is significantly more
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Figure 4.7: Left Panel: contagion probability as a function of µb for homogeneous
and heterogeneous distribution of banks’ sizes. Blue squares: system with similar
balance sheet sizes. Red circles: system with heterogeneous balance sheet sizes.
The system is subject to random bank failures in both cases. Contagion probabil-
ity is wider in the heterogeneous system relative to the homogeneous case. Right
Panel: Targeted shocks on a system with heterogeneous distribution of banks’ bal-
ance sheet sizes. Blue squares: contagion probability when a random bank is per-
turbed. Red circles: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the biggest
banks. Green diamonds: contagion probability when shocks are targeted at the
smallest banks. Targeting shocks at the biggest bank results in the widest unstable
region. Result refer to 1000 simulations for N = M = 1000.
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unstable when exogenous shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% biggest banks but
more stable when the shocks are targeted at any of the top 5% smallest banks. This
follows from the fact that big banks hold larger amounts assets for each value of
µb relative to other banks, which implies that targeting shocks at them would cause
higher devaluations of the asset classes they hold, effectively fuelling the contagion
mechanism that leads to a wider unstable region. I refer to these banks as ”Too Big
To Fail” (TBTF).
In summary, the findings of the stress tests conducted in Section 4.3 are the
following:
(i) Introducing heterogeneity in the degrees of banks exacerbates the fragility of
the system to random shocks in contrast to (Caccioli et al. 2011; Gai and
Kapadia 2010) who show that a scalefree counterparty network results in a
more robust system with respect to random shocks. We find that this result is
independent of the type of exogenous shock (i.e. bank or asset shock). Fur-
thermore, we find that targeting the most specialised banks makes the system
more unstable.
(ii) Heterogeneity in asset concentrations improves the resilience of the system
to random shocks in contrast to heterogeneous bank degrees. Moreover, tar-
geting highly concentrated assets increases the probability of contagion, how-
ever the average degree threshold where contagion dies out is effectively un-
changed.
(iii) Cascading default is halted slightly faster when banks have homogeneous
sizes relative to the heterogeneous case and is greater when exogenous shocks
are targeted at the biggest banks.
4.4 Policy Impact Analysis
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has precipitated calls for higher regulatory capital
requirements for banks. Although higher capital requirements can improve financial
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stability, they however carry some implicit costs 2 namely reduced profitability for
banks and higher lending cost which may have a negative impact on social welfare
(Bridges et al. 2014; Brooke et al. 2015; IMF 2016). Hence, it is important that
new regulatory capital requirements are assigned to banks in the way that gives the
most stable configuration. To this end, I investigate how the intuition developed
from the stress tests in Section 4.3 can influence capital based regulatory policies.
I then propose an alternative non-capital based policy by studying the structure of
the bipartite network.
4.4.1 Capital based policy
Here, I compare the performance of possible capital policy models following the
intuition developed in Section 4.3. In each model, the same amount of capital χ
is injected into the system. The difference in the policies lies in the way χ is dis-
tributed amongst the banks.
4.4.1.1 Targeted versus random
The stress tests done in Section 4.3 suggests that the ”Too Specialised To Fail” and
”Too Big To Fail” banks are systemically important. Hence, it becomes interesting
to ask if assigning capital requirements to only this group of banks can improve
financial stability relative to targeting a random group of banks. I consider two
kinds of targeted policies. In one, I assign the capital equally to only the top 5%
most specialised banks and refer to this policy as TS while in the second, which I
call TB, only the top 5% biggest banks are required to hold more capital. I model a
random policy for comparison. In the random policy, 5% of the banks are randomly
selected and assigned additional capital requirements equally.
TS : I now investigate the stability impact of the TS policy relative to the random
policy as such I abstract away from the influence of size by assuming similar balance
sheet sizes across all banks. I show this comparison in left panel of Figure 4.8 by
2This is based on the assumption that Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, which essentially
implies that a bank’s capital structure does not affect profit or social welfare in an idealised world
without frictions such as interest payments on debts, taxes, bankruptcy and agency costs (Franco
Modigliani 1958).
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computing the ratio R of the contagion probability of both policies as a function
of µb such that R = 1 implies similar performance, R > 1 means the TS policy
supersedes the random policy and R< 1 implies that the random policy outperforms
the TS policy. I focus our analysis on only those regions where contagion occurs in
both systems to avoid divisions by zero. The plot suggests that a policy that focuses
on the most specialised banks results in greater stability relative to a random policy
in the region with high values of µb, which is significant from a policy perspective
because real world financial networks are more likely to be in this region.
The right panel of Figure 4.8 provides an insight to why the TS policy out-
performs the random policy. It shows the probability that a bank i with degree ki
defaults before the occurrence of contagion. The plot suggest that the specialised
banks are the most likely to default before contagion occurs. As such, it is reason-
able to conjecture that focusing the capital policy on these banks is more likely to
increase the resilience of the system.
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Figure 4.8: Left panel: Stability impact of TS policy relative to the random policy
for a system with heterogeneous bank degrees. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e.
R=1. The TS policy produces more stability relative to the random policy for high
values of µb. Right panel: Probability that a bank i with degree µi defaults before
contagion occurs. The most specialised banks have a greater chance of defaulting
before contagion occurs.
TB : I now abstract from heterogeneous degrees and consider only heterogeneous
sizes in-order to study the stability impact of the TB policy relative to the random
4.4. Policy Impact Analysis 68
policy. I show this comparison in left panel of Figure 4.9 by computing the ratio R of
the contagion probability of both policies as a function of µb such that R= 1 implies
similar performance, R > 1 means the TB policy supersedes the random policy and
R < 1 implies that the random policy outperforms the TB policy. The plot markers
oscillate around 1 suggesting that a policy that focuses only on the biggest banks is
not effective.
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Figure 4.9: Left panel: Stability impact of TB policy relative to the random policy
for a system with heterogeneous bank sizes. Dotted line: comparison basis i.e.
R = 1. The TB policy appears to be ineffective relative to the random policy. Right
panel: Probability that a bank i with size Ai (shown in log scale) defaults before
contagion occurs. The biggest banks have a greater chance of defaulting before the
occurrence of contagion.
In order to understand why the TB policy does not perform better than the
random policy, I plot the probability that a bank i with size Ai defaults before the
occurrence of contagion in the right panel of Figure 4.9 and find that big banks have
a smaller chance of failing before contagion occurs. This implies that allocating
capital requirements to only these banks is likely to be ineffective in the context of
this model.
4.4.1.2 Diversification versus size
In the previous section, I simplified the model in-order to separate the impact of di-
versification and size. However, it is also interesting to ask which of the two factors
namely diversification and size is the more significant factor for capital requirement
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policies. In-order to facilitate this comparison, I introduce heterogeneity into the
degrees and sizes of the banks. The diversification-based policy I consider assigns
capital requirements to banks based on their degrees such that banks with higher
degrees are required to hold lesser capital i.e.
εi =
1/ki
∑i 1/ki
χ (4.8)
Where, ki denotes the degree of bank i. While the size-based policy allocates capital
requirements to banks based on the size of their balance sheets such that big banks
are required to hold more capital i.e.
εi =
Ai
∑i Ai
χ (4.9)
Where, Ai denotes the size of bank i. In Figure 4.10, I compare the stability
impact of a diversification based policy relative to a size based policy by computing
the ratio R of their respective contagion probabilities as a function of µb such that
R = 1 implies similar performance, R > 1 means the diversification based policy
supersedes the size based policy and R < 1 implies that the size based policy out-
performs the diversification based policy. The figure suggests that assigning capital
based on a bank’s degree supersedes assignment based on size further confirming
recent findings reported by Cai et al. (2012).
4.4.2 Non-capital based policy
From a policy maker’s perspective, it is interesting to ask if there is a network struc-
ture that improves systemic stability without imposing new capital requirements
(see Thurner and Poledna 2013, for example)? I address this question by intro-
ducing some structural correlation into the bipartite network. In the subsequent
paragraphs, I use the term ”assortative network” for a bipartite network in which
the most diversified banks hold the most widely held (i.e. concentrated) assets and
”disassortative network” for one in which the most specialised banks hold the most
widely held assets while the most diversified banks hold the least held assets. The
correlated networks are generated based on the algorithm proposed in Noh (2007).
The procedure essentially involves minimising a network cost function until a sta-
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Figure 4.10: Stability impact of policy based on diversification relative to policy
based on size as a function of µb for a system with heterogeneous sizes and degrees.
Using banks’ diversification levels as a proxy for assigning capital requirements is
superior to using bank sizes.
tionary state using Monte Carlos simulations. This cost function is defined as:
H(G) =−J
2
N
∑
i, j=1
ai jkik j (4.10)
ai j
0, if i = j1, otherwise
Where, ki = ∑ j ai j and J denotes a control parameter for tuning the level of assor-
tativity i.e. J < 0(J > 0) gives a disassortative (assortative) network respectively
while J = 0 produces an uncorrelated network.
In the left panel of Figure 4.11, I study the resilience of the system as a function
of µb for the different network configurations for the case when a random bank
fails. The right panel shows the same plot but for the case when a random asset is
devalued. In both cases, we find that the disassortative network produces the most
stable configuration. This is so because in a disassortative network, assets with high
concentration are held by the most fragile banks (i.e. banks with low degrees). This
implies that fire sales impact on the asset prices resulting from the default of any of
these fragile banks would be minimal. However, in the assortative network, assets
with low concentration degrees are held by these fragile banks, which implies that
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Figure 4.11: Left Panel: Contagion probability as a function of µb for different net-
work correlation configurations subject to the initial failure of a random bank. Blue
squares: Uncorrelated network. Red circles: Assortative network. Green diamonds:
disassortative network. The disassortative network gives the most stable configura-
tion, while the assortative network results in the most unstable system. Right Panel:
Contagion probability as a function of µb for different network correlation configu-
rations. Again, the disassortative network gives the most stable configuration.
the fire sales resulting from their default would be much more severe thus leading
to a wider unstable region. This result raises a question of whether it is possible to
implement a structure of incentives that makes the bipartite network disassortative?
4.5 Impact of Leverage
I now study the joint role of leverage (i.e. λ ) and average degree (i.e. µb) on the sta-
bility of our heterogeneous system. In Figure 4.12, I show that the existence of the
critical leverage threshold for which contagion occurs with non-zero probability re-
ported by Caccioli et al. (2014) for a homogeneous system is preserved when banks
have heterogeneous degrees for each µb and that this threshold is increasing with
µb irrespective of other prevailing conditions. This suggests that it may be possible
for a financial regulator to permit higher leverage in the system by promoting an
appropriate diversification strategy that achieves a particular value of µb which may
not be individually optimal for the banks similar to the findings reported in (Beale
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et al. 2011; Tasca et al. 2014).
Figure 4.12: The non-white region refers to parameter values of λ and µb that result
in non-zero contagion probability. There is a critical leverage value below which
the system is stable for any value of µb.
4.6 Conclusion
Previous studies on overlapping portfolios have relied on the assumption of homo-
geneity in the degrees and sizes of banks, however, empirical findings show that
real financial networks deviate from this assumption (Boss et al. 2004; Braverman
and Minca 2014; Guo et al. 2015; Marotta et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012).
In particular, they provide evidence that bank degrees and sizes follow power law
distributions. In our work, I generalised the model recently introduced in (Caccioli
et al. 2014) to account for these features. This approach makes it possible to study
the systemic risk contribution of different types of banks with varying degrees and
sizes. I found that separately introducing heterogeneity into the degrees and sizes of
the banks widen the unstable region relative to the homogeneous case with respect
to the initial failure of a random bank but not with respect to targeted shocks. In
contrast, heterogeneity in asset concentrations makes the system more resilient to
random shocks but not with respect to targeted shocks.
Based on these intuitions, I proceeded to study possible capital policy models.
Our findings suggest that a regulatory capital policy that assigns capital require-
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ments to the most specialised banks performs better than random capital assign-
ments when the network connectivity is high. However, focusing capital require-
ments on only the biggest bank does not appear to be effective relative to random
assignments within the context of our model. Furthermore, I investigated the rele-
vance of using diversification or size in building the capital based policies and find
that the diversification-based policy outperforms the size based policy with increas-
ing network connectivity.
I then proposed a non-capital based policy that improves financial stability by
introducing structural correlation into the bipartite network. Our results suggest
that disassortative mixing (i.e. connecting the most specialised banks with the most
concentrated assets) improves the resilience of the system. This can be understood
from the fact that the fire sales impact of the specialised banks is significantly re-
duced due to the smaller quantity of traded shares relative to the entire volume of
the assets. Finally, I studied the joint role of leverage and average degree on the sta-
bility of our heterogeneous system and found that the existence of a critical leverage
beyond which contagion occurs with non-zero probability for each average degree
reported in (Caccioli et al. 2014) for a homogeneous system is preserved when
banks have heterogeneous degree distribution. This finding further reinforces calls
for policy makers to compensate for higher system risk induced by higher leverage
by promoting an appropriate diversification strategy.
In the next chapter, I break away from the mechanistic stress test models used
in this chapter and consider a more realistic agent based model in which the sys-
temic risk from overlapping portfolios is endogenously created. This way I can im-
plement measures to disincentive banks from structuring their portfolios in a manner
that increases the fragility of the system.
Chapter 5
Diversification
5.1 Introduction
There is growing similarity in the asset side of banks’ balance sheets due to in-
creased participation in the same global markets (Cai et al. 2012; Liu 2015; Wagner
2010). I consider the consequences of this on financial stability. A major motivation
for the increasing similarity is rooted in the standard financial and perhaps intuitive
diversification advice “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket”. In fact, the seminal
work of Markowitz (1952) on portfolio selection provides evidence that diversifi-
cation across various asset classes reduces the aggregate risk of a bank’s portfolio.
It is thus reasonable to conclude that if each bank becomes less risky due to diver-
sification then the financial system should become more stable. Moreover, several
reports before the 2007 financial crisis found little evidence for a systemic break-
down of the financial system owing to the high diversification levels at individual
banks due to the extent of financial innovation (Bartram et al. 2007; Elsinger et al.
2006; Furfine 2003). However, the financial system still came close to near collapse
even though banks, especially the big ones, had become largely diversified.
This conundrum stems from an individual bank not considering the fact that
other banks are pursuing the same risk objective by diversifying their balance sheets
across the same set of asset classes. This results in individual banks becoming
less differentiable. From a systemic perspective, a less differentiable set of banks
increases fragility and exacerbates the risk of joint failures of a large part of the
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financial system, which can have serious consequences on social welfare. This phe-
nomenon draws a parallel in ecological studies where genetic diversity, for instance,
is shown to result in greater resilience to disease spread (see Tilman 1999, for a de-
tailed discussion).
Thus, diversification appears to serve multiple roles; on one hand, it makes
banks less risky but on the other hand it increases the risk of joint failures. This
dual role of diversification on financial stability has prompted active discussions
amongst policy makers and academics in a growing number of studies. For in-
stance, the reports by (Allen and Carletti 2006; Allen and Gale 2005; Wagner 2008;
Wagner 2010; Wagner and Marsh 2006) show that diversification increases the like-
lihood of a systemic crisis due to the homogenization of the financial system even
though it is desirable in terms of reducing the probability of an individual bank fail-
ure. Similar findings are reported by Battiston et al. (2012b). In a related work,
Caccioli et al. (2014) study the role of diversification on financial contagion due
to overlapping portfolios and showed that the system undergoes two phase transi-
tions with increasing diversification between which global cascades can occur. This
finding is also reported in the work by Raffestin (2014). Tasca et al. (2014) show
that diversification can have ambiguous consequences on the stability of the finan-
cial system by studying the joint impact of leverage and diversification on financial
stability using a structural risk model based on the framework proposed by Merton
(1974). They show that a critical leverage value can result in alternating phases of
stability and instability depending on the diversification strategy. Finally, while our
focus is on diversification, however our work is also related to the literature on bank
herding since they both lead to concentrations in the same set of activities (see, for
instance, Acharya and Yorulmazer 2005; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007).
I contribute to this strand of literature by studying the consequences of diver-
sification on the stability of the financial system in terms of idiosyncratic and sys-
temic risk endogenously produced from an evolving stylised economy, which sets
our work apart from previous studies. Moreover, our approach provides a simple
mechanism for analysing the full effect of regulatory responses to negative exter-
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nalities associated with the impact of diversification on financial stability and the
wider economy.
Our approach consists of a deliberately simplified agent based model that cou-
ples a financial system and the real economy. There is a large literature on macro-
finance interaction models including (Bask 2012; De Grauwe and Macchiarelli
2015; Lengnick and Wohltmann 2016; Naimzada and Pireddu 2014; Westerhoff
2012). These works couple agent-based financial(stock) market and mainstream
macro models. However, I deviate from these models by focusing on externalities
resulting from credit/loan network rather than traded equities/shares 1. In a nutshell,
the model implements a self-organising economy populated by rationally bounded
heterogeneous agents including firms, households and banks interacting within dif-
ferent markets without central coordination (see Fagiolo and Roventini 2012, for
an elaborate discussion on decentralised economic systems). The model dynam-
ics leads to the emergence of bank-bank and bank-firm links that are strategically
formed and terminated. These networks serve as channels of contagion and shock
propagation. In this sense, the model shares some similarity with the strand of lit-
erature on multilayer network theory and financial contagion (Caccioli et al. 2015;
Kok 2013; Lux 2016; Martinez-Jaramillo et al. 2014; Poledna et al. 2015) since it
leads to the formation of different network structures that serve as contagion rein-
forcing mechanisms.
Although, I only consider diversification in the loan portfolio of banks as the
cause for increased similarity amongst banks. However, other reasons for increased
similarity across financial institutions have been identified in the literature on bank
herding such as the increasing adoption of standardised and “best practise” risk
management and trading strategies across financial institutions that causes them
to respond to market conditions in the same way (Farrell and Saloner 1985). For
instance, the 2007 quant meltdown event, during which several large quantitative
long-short equity hedge funds experienced massive losses resulting from following
1This is motivated by the fact that empirical reports published in 2007 for banks in the United
Kingdom, for instance, suggest that on average 80% of a bank’s balance sheet represented loans
given to firms while only about 10% was allocated to equities (see Anand et al. 2013)
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the same trading strategy that encouraged multiple rounds of asset liquidation after
one or more funds rapidly liquidated a large chunk of their portfolio. This situa-
tion caused prices to spiral downwards and eventually led to large portfolio losses
across the system (see Khandani and Lo 2007, for an elaborate discussion on this
event). Acharya and Yorulmazer 2005; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007 further sug-
gest higher probability of being bailed out in the event of joint failures as another
reason why banks undertake similar activities.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, I describe
the main features of the model. Section 5.4 characterises the stability features of
the financial system due to diversification. I then propose a regulatory policy that
permits diversification without exacerbating systemic risk in Section 5.5. Finally, a
summary of our findings is presented in Section 5.6.
5.2 Model
For the purpose of this study, I extend the CRISIS Mark 1 agent based model ex-
tensively studied in (Delli Gatti et al. 2011; Gualdi et al. 2015; Klimek et al. 2015;
Poledna and Thurner 2016). The original CRISIS Mark 1 model specifies a stock-
flow consistent system that couples the real economy and a limited financial sys-
tem. I extend the model to include different production sectors in the real economy.
Furthermore, I include simplified credit and interbank markets so that banks play
an active role in the economy unlike the original model specification in which the
banking sector is passive.
Figure 5.1 provides a high-level view of the agents and their interactions within
the model discussed elaborately in the following sections: In a nutshell, the model
implements a self-organising economy populated by rationally bounded heteroge-
neous agents including firms, households and banks interacting within different
markets without central coordination. Households interact with firms on the labour
and consumption market, banks interact with other banks on the interbank market
while firms and banks interact within different sectors on the credit market resulting
in a constantly evolving (i.e. links are strategically formed and terminated) bank-
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Figure 5.1: High-level view of agents’ interactions
bank network and bipartite network of bank-firm links respectively.
The economy I consider comprises different sectors and each firm is assigned
to a sector. I control the level of diversification (diversity) of the financial system
using a single parameter that fixes the number of sectors each bank can lend to on the
credit market. A time period in our model corresponds to 1 day in which the agents
carry out the following sequence of operations or decisions. Our model belongs to
the class of ”one-step” models see Delli Gatti et al. 2011; Dosi et al. 2010; Klimek
et al. 2015, for examples. In contrast, other works in the literature (Erlingsson et al.
2014b; Gaffeo et al. 2008; Lengnick 2013) use models that capture heterogeneous
and real-world timescales . In our model, agents carry out the following sequence
of operations or decisions in each time period.
1. Firms set their production and pricing strategies heterogeneously
2. Firms update their labour and loan demand accordingly.
3. Banks propose interest rates to firms heterogeneously and may raise liquidity
to service loans.
4. Firms recruit (fire), produce goods and pay wages
5. Banks receive deposits from their customers
6. Households attempt to spend a proportion of their savings on consumption.
7. Banks and firms attempt to meet obligatory payments namely dividends, loan
repayments and interests.
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8. Illiquid firms are liquidated, and their assets shared pro-rata among creditors
9. Banks with negative equity are said to be insolvent and are bailed-in by their
creditors and(or) customers
5.2.1 Firms
1. There are N f firms in the model. Each firm is randomly assigned to a sector
s and produces perishable goods 2. The goods produced by firms are perfect
substitutes for the consumer. There are Ns sectors in the model.
2. A sector in our model represents a conceptual group of random firms. A
firm follows heuristic rules proposed in (Delli Gatti et al. 2011; Gualdi et al.
2015; Klimek et al. 2015) in setting its production and price targets. The
rules are based on the demand for a firm’s goods and average market price
in its sector. In a nut shell, Equation 5.1 implies that if demand is lower
than expected a firm will reduce its production target provided its price is less
than the average price in its sector otherwise it reduces its price instead. The
reverse is followed if the firm sold all its goods in the previous time step.
Y Ti (t+1) = Yi(t)[1+ γyΓi(t)] if
 Yi(t) = Di(t) andpi(t)> p¯s(t)
Y Ti (t+1) = Yi(t)[1− γyΓi(t)] if
 Yi(t)> Di(t) andpi(t)< p¯s(t) (5.1)
pi(t+1) = pi(t)[1+ γpΓi(t)] if
 Yi(t) = Di(t) andpi(t)< p¯s(t)
pi(t+1) = pi(t)[1− γpΓi(t)] if
 Yi(t)> Di(t) andpi(t)> p¯s(t)
where Di(t) is the total demand for the goods produced by firm i at time t,
and
p¯s(t) =
∑si pi(t)Di(t)
∑i Di(t)
(5.2)
2Perishable in this context means the unsold goods cannot be preserved for the next time period
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p¯s(t) is the average price of sold goods in sector s at time t, Γi(t) is drawn
from the uniform distribution U [0,1] for each firm while γy & γp drawn from
U [0,1] represent the production and price adjustment parameter respectively.
Y Ti & Yi denote the target and realised production of firm i. I assume that the
case Y (t) = D(t) also implies the case Y (t)> D(t) in our implementation.
3. Each firm computes the required workforce to achieve its target Y Ti based on
the following production function.
Y Ti (t) = αL
d
i (t) (5.3)
where Ldi (t) denotes the labour demand for firm i at time t
4. Each firm randomly approaches one of the registered banks in its sector for
loans to cover its liquidity shortfall given by:
max(0,Ldi (t)Wi(t)−Ci) (5.4)
where Ci denotes the cash of firm i and Wi represents its wage.
5. As in (Klimek et al. 2015; Poledna and Thurner 2016), banks propose interest
rates for each firm using an increasing function of the firm’s financial fragility
Li defined as the ratio of its total debt to its cash i.e.
rb,i(t) = r0(1+ ε)[1+ tanh(µLi(t))] (5.5)
where r0 is the baseline interest rate, ε is drawn from the uniform distribu-
tion U [0,1] to capture bank variations such as investment strategy and µ is a
constant that controls the sensitive of the process.
6. Each firm attempts to repay a percentage τ and the interest due on its loan.
Our approach implies a decrease in the amount of debt repaid as only a per-
centage of the remaining debt is paid each time period. An alternative ap-
proach will require the firm to pay a fixed amount of the debt each time pe-
riod. We use the former in-order to ensure ergodicity of the model for long
time periods. Finally, if the firm makes a profit after meeting these financial
obligations, it pays a certain percentage η of this profit to its owner.
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5.2.2 Banks
1. There are Nb banks in the model. I consider a simplified structure for a typical
bank’s balance sheet as shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: A stylised representation of a typical bank’s balance sheet structure
(a) φs = 1 (b) φs = 10 (c) φs = 20
Figure 5.3: Bank-firm network for different values of φs. Black circles: Banks.
White circles: Firms.
2. A bank receives deposits from its customers. I assume that banks only receive
deposits from households (including firm owners) but not from firms in-order
to keep the model simple.
3. A bank can only provide loans to φs distinct sectors. I consider φs as a bank’s
diversification level and not its number of lending links with firms (i.e. its
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degree). This approach implies that we can exogenously tune the level of
diversification of banks using a single parameter such that 1 ≤ φs ≤ Ns. As
such, banks become exposed to the same firms with increasing φs as shown
in Figure 5.3. Specifically, I show the bank-firm networks for different values
of φs in Figure 5.3.
4. I set Ns = Nb in-order to create the case where all banks lend to all sectors
and where all banks lend to distinct sectors.
5. A bank supplies the loan requested by firms. If the bank does not have enough
cash to fulfil the due loan, it attempts to raise the shortfall from Mb other banks
on the interbank market. If it is unable to raise the required cash, it resorts to
the lender of last resort. This approach implies that banks can always raise
enough cash to provide loans. While this assumption is rather simplified,
it allows us to focus solely on the macroeconomic impact of diversification
without mixing in cash constraint. I have also experimented with another ver-
sion in which banks cannot raise cash from the central bank to provide loans
and find that the qualitative features of the model are preserved, however the
system state is not ergodic after t = 1500.
6. Each bank services the interest due on its interbank debt and repays a pro-
portion τ of this debt. Our focus is on bank failures due to balance-sheet
insolvency; thus, I abstract away from illiquidity by assuming that an illiquid
bank that cannot raise cash from the interbank market can always resort to the
central bank to cover its liquidity shortfall.
7. A bank is required to keep a percentage ζ of its total deposits in a reserve
account at the central bank.
5.2.3 Households
As in (Delli Gatti et al. 2011; Gualdi et al. 2015; Klimek et al. 2015), households in
our model are endowed with the following behaviours:
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1. Each household is either a firm owner or a worker. A firm owner does not
work but receives dividend payments each time period depending on whether
or not its firm makes a profit. A worker supplies one unit of labour in-
elastically.
2. Each household is randomly assigned to a bank and continues to save its cash
in this bank throughout the simulation.
3. At every time step, an employed household switches to a firm offering higher
wages with probability ϕ . Unemployed workers are then randomly assigned
to firms with vacancies.
4. Each household attempts to spend a proportion Ch of its savings in M f ran-
domly chosen firms. The selected firms are then approached in increasing
order of their selling prices. Also, it is possible that a household’s needs are
not completely satisfied thus making the consumption market inefficient.
5.2.4 Contagion mechanism
The consumption market dynamic described above induces random shocks in the
performance of firms. If a firm is unable to meets its financial obligations, its owner
would try to cover the liquidity shortfall. In-case this is not sufficient, the firm is
liquidated and its asset plus the owner’s wealth is shared pro-rata among its cred-
itors. The owner immediately starts a new firm with expected demand and price
set to the average across all firms. This process may result in some of its creditors
(i.e. banks) writing-off portions of the loans. This dynamic may cause one or more
banks to fail.
A bank is deemed to have failed whenever its equity falls below zero (i.e. it
becomes insolvent) due to loan defaults. A failed bank is resolved using a bail-in
resolution tool see Benczur et al. 2017; Conlon and Cotter 2014; Hu¨ser et al. 2017;
Klimek et al. 2015, for elaborate discussions on bail-in. Basically, this involves
restructuring the balance sheet of the failed bank such that some of its liabilities
(interbank loans & deposits) are converted into equity.
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I implement this by subtracting a one-time levy (required to cover the neg-
ative equity position) and a small overhead ξ (required to ensure continued bank
operations) from its deposit and interbank loan accounts proportional to their sizes.
Hence, the losses are borne by the bank customers and other banks that have pro-
vided loan to it on the interbank market in exchange for ownership rights. This
procedure effectively creates a contagion channel through the bank-bank network
and enables some of the bankruptcy cost to be borne directly by households.
5.3 Model Calibration and Validation
I initialise the model with parameters stipulated in Table 5.1 based on existing work
in the literature (Gualdi et al. 2015; Klimek et al. 2015; Poledna and Thurner 2016).
These works generally attempt to calibrate the model based on existing micro-
founded behavioural studies as in (Geanakoplos et al. 2012; Hommes 2013). Gualdi
et al. (2015) study the characteristics of the model in a space of parameters. They
show for instance the existence of a phase transition from economic stability to in-
stability that is robust to model modifications. Furthermore, Poledna and Thurner
(2016) show that model can reproduce systemic risk profiles of the biggest banks in
the Austrian financial system using the parameters in Table 5.1.
Consequently, the model is validated against its ability to reproduce an ensem-
ble of stylized facts reported in real economies. In Figure 5.4, I show the emergence
of interesting macro and microeconomic phenomena from the decentralised model
dynamics. Specifically, in Figure 5.4a, we observe the emergence of alternation
of booms and recessions in aggregate output like business cycles reported in real
national GDP data. These cycles have been found to endogenously arise when the
assumptions of perfect ex ante coordination and walrasian market clearing are re-
laxed (Gualdi et al. 2015; Lengnick 2013).
The top right panel shows a negative correlation between change in output
(∆Y = Yt −Yt+1) and change in unemployment (∆U = Ut −Ut+1) consistent with
Okun’s law (Prachowny 1993). Beveridge’s curve is shown to emerge from the
model’s labour dynamics in Figure 5.4c i.e. a negative relationship between vacancy
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Figure 5.4: Emergent macroeconomic phenomena from a representative simulation.
(a) Output (b) Okun’s law (c) Beveridge curve (d) Power-law firm size distribution
rate (measured as the ratio of job openings to the number of employable households)
and unemployment rate (Nickell et al. 1960). Finally, we observe the emergence of
a power law distribution of firm sizes in Figure 5.4d consistent with empirical find-
ings in real economies (Axtell 2001). Although, the agent based model I consider
is simple, it still comes close to displaying phenomena observed in real economics
emerging from the self-organising and complex interactions between the heteroge-
neous agents in an evolving system lacking central coordination without recourse to
over-simplified assumptions of rationality, representative agents and general equi-
librium.
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5.4 Stability Analysis
In this section, I investigate the systemic and idiosyncratic risk inherent in the fi-
nancial system based due to only the bank-firm network. Idiosyncratic risk refers
to the probability of a one-off or isolated bank failure. The failure of Barings bank
in 1995, for instance, was an isolated event and specific to Barings (see Fay 1997,
for an elaborate discussion on this event). Systemic risk on the other hand refers
to the probability of a large part of the financial system failing. A good example
is the 2007 financial crisis during which major financial institutions like American
International Group (AIG), Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup etc. either
failed or had to be saved from failing by different government intervention schemes
(Bullard et al. 2009).
I measure systemic risk in terms of the probability of observing a global cas-
cade of bank defaults (i.e. joint bank failures) while idiosyncratic risk refers to the
probability of observing an isolated bank default in a simulation. In our analysis, a
global cascade of defaults is said to occur if the number of bank failures exceeds a
defined threshold θ . Unless otherwise stated, I define θ as 25% of the total number
of banks and abstract from the impact of the bank-bank network by counting only
bank failures before bail-in occurs in each time period. Moreover, I account for
randomness present in the labour, consumption and credit market by averaging over
300 simulations with each simulation spanning 2500 time periods.
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Figure 5.5: Emergent idiosyncratic risk as a function of φs due to only loan defaults
using 300 simulations with each simulation spanning 2500 time periods.
5.4. Stability Analysis 87
5 10 15 20
φ
s
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Sy
st
em
ic 
ris
k 
(θ=
25
%
)
(a) θ = 25%
5 10 15 20
φ
s
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Sy
st
em
ic 
ris
k 
(θ=
50
%
)
×10-4
(b) θ = 50%
Figure 5.6: Emergent systemic risk as a function of φs. Diversification increases
systemic risk. Results remain qualitatively unchanged with respect to θ
Figure 5.5 reveals that idiosyncratic risk is decreasing with diversification. In
contrast, Figure 5.6a shows that systemic risk is increasing with diversification. We
find that the qualitative behaviour of this result is preserved by changing θ to 50%
as shown in Figure 5.6b. These results are echoed in the recent work by Gurgone et
al. (2018). The reason why increasing diversification appears to increase systemic
risk but reduce idiosyncratic risk can be intuitively understood from the fact that
banks become less diverse and increasingly exposed to the same sectors as they
become more diversified (i.e. the bank-firm network becomes more connected)
such that negative spill overs emanating from the real sector during a recession is
able to affect many banks. However, diversification ensures that a bank’s risk is
not concentrated in any one sector such that the negative impact of downturns in a
sector becomes smaller on the bank, effectively reducing the probability of the bank
failing.
5.4.1 Impact of contagion
In the discussion above, I abstracted from the impact of contagion arising from
the bank-bank network (i.e. links between banks) and concentrated only on the
impact of the bank-firm network. In this section, I briefly characterise the joint
impact of both network layers. The squares in Figure 5.7 denote systemic risk due to
only the bank-firm network while the circles show the joint impact of the bank-firm
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and bank-bank networks. Thereby suggesting that the bank-bank network serves
to amplify contagion in agreement with reports in (Caccioli et al. 2015; Lux 2016;
Wagner 2010).
5 10 15 20
φ
s
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
Sy
st
em
ic 
ris
k
Figure 5.7: Emergent systemic risk as a function of φs. Squares: bank-firm network
only. Circles: Joint impact of the bank-firm and bank-bank network.
Specifically, it appears the contagion impact of the bank-bank network be-
comes pronounced with increasing diversification. In contrast to natural expecta-
tions that diversification should reduce contagion spread from bank failures since
it makes the banks individually safer. This follows from the fact that the negative
spill over from the real economy would initially weaken more banks as they become
more exposed to the same sectors such that additional losses suffered through the
bank-bank network may easily trigger more cascading defaults.
5.4.2 Social cost
I measure social cost in terms of the average rate of losses from the financial system
since this is the amount in Dollars that would be required if the banks were to be
bailed out by the government with taxpayers’ money. I define average rate of losses
over a period T as AL =∑Tt=1TotalSystemLiabilitiest−TotalSystemAssetst and plot
it as a function of φs in the left panel of Figure 5.8.
Our notation implies that increasing values denote greater loss. As such Fig-
ure 5.8 suggests that increasing diversification leads to higher social cost. Moreover,
in the right panel of Figure 5.8, I show the impact of diversification on the real econ-
omy in terms of the aggregate credit volume. Specifically, I compare each level of
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Figure 5.8: Average rate of losses and credit volume as a function of φs.
diversification relative to the completely un-diversified case (i.e φs = 1). The plots
suggest that diversification is having a negative impact on the real economy. This
follows from the fact that diversification leads to a higher risk of the joint failure of
many banks.
5.4.3 Robust yet fragile
The financial system has been shown to exhibit a ”robust-yet-fragile” behaviour
such that while the likelihood of a global cascade is low, the effects are usually
widespread whenever it occurs (Caccioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010; Mis-
trulli 2011). I contribute to this strand of studies by investigating if our model also
produces the ”robust-yet-fragile” property? I do this by computing the conditional
extent of cascades which I define as the average number of bank failures for the
cases when global cascades occur.
In Figure 5.9, I plot the probability of a global cascade and the corresponding
extent of cascades as a function of φs. We find that while global cascades are very
unlikely, however, a large part of the financial system is hit whenever it occurs
particularly for low levels of diversification. For instance, while the probability for
a global cascade is almost negligible (i.e. 5.2267× 10−4) when φs = 1, however,
more than 25% of banks are hit whenever a global cascade does occur.
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Figure 5.9: Probability and extent of global cascades as a function of φs. Squares:
probability for global cascades. Circles: conditional extent of cascades.
5.4.4 Preferential bank-firm model
So far, I have characterised the stability of the system based on the bank-firm link
formation process outlined in subsection 5.2.1. However, the work done by (Marotta
et al. 2015; Masi and Gallegati 2012) suggests the presence of preferential lending
relationships between banks and firms. In particular, they show that the degree
distribution of banks in the bank-firm network is dependent on their balance sheet
sizes such that the big banks tend to have more links with the real sector than small
banks.
Moreover, empirical studies suggest that firms tend to form persistent links
with certain banks in order to minimise agency cost and develop readily accessible
credit lines (Agarwal and Ann Elston 2001; Ferri and Messori 2000; Fidrmuc et al.
2015; Temizsoy et al. 2015). It then becomes interesting to ask what is the stability
impact of introducing this kind of preference structure into the network of loans
from banks to firms? To address this question, I re-design the bank-firm lending
relationship such that a firm in a sector s forms a lending relationship with bank b
from the set Bs of banks registered in sector s with a probability pb f . I compute pb f
as a function of the bank’s balance sheet size Ab and the number of existing links
between f and b (µb f ) i.e.
pb f =
Abµb f
∑
b∈Bs
Abµb f
(5.6)
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This network formation process typically introduces a scale-free structure through
the creation of a few banks with relatively higher degrees (i.e. more exposures to
the real sector) than others. In Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11, I compare the stability
impact of this structure to our benchmark model using the same initial configuration
and random number seed for respective simulations. I refer to the original bank-firm
model outlined in subsection 5.2.1 as the benchmark model.
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Figure 5.10: Emergent idiosyncratic risk as a function of φs. Squares: Benchmark
model. Circles: Preferential model
We find that the emergent risk profiles retain the same features identified in
the benchmark case (i.e. lower idiosyncratic risk and higher systemic risk with
increasing diversification). However, the plot in Figure 5.10 suggests that preferen-
tial attachment induces more idiosyncratic risk into the system, especially for high
levels of diversification. This follows from the fact that the preferential network for-
mation process I consider results in some banks that are over-diversified (thus less
likely to fail) and others that are under-diversified and more prone to default. This
effectively increases the aggregate idiosyncratic risk in the financial system relative
to the case of the benchmark model.
Furthermore, the plot in Figure 5.11 suggests that preferential attachment re-
duces systemic risk. This provides more credence to reports in the complex net-
works literature that show that scale-free networks comprising few highly connected
nodes (i.e. hubs) and many nodes with low connectivity are more robust to random
shocks (Albert et al. 2000; Albert et al. 2002; Caccioli et al. 2011; Gai et al. 2011).
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The stability analysis from the benchmark simulation which shows that diversifi-
cation reduces idiosyncratic risk while diversity decreases systemic risk provides
an intuition for this result. Basically, the evolving preferential network effectively
introduces more diversity into the system through the creation of many relatively
isolated banks (i.e. banks with low degrees), which is desirable from the point of
view of reducing the probability of joint failures (i.e. systemic risk).
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Figure 5.11: Emergent systemic risk as a function of φs. Squares: Benchmark
model. Circles: Preferential model
5.5 Policy Impact Analysis
In the previous section, I showed that diversification reduces idiosyncratic risk,
however, it also makes the financial system less diverse consequently leading to
more joint failures (i.e. higher systemic risk). It then becomes interesting to ask
if it is possible to design polices that permit diversification without exacerbating
systemic risk?
A possible way of achieving this is to increase capital requirements of banks
relative to their similarity with the rest of the financial system such that banks with
higher degrees of similarity are required to more capital. Moreover, it is known from
the literature that higher capital requirements improve the stability of the financial
system. However, higher capital requirements come at a cost of reduced lending to
the real sector (see Bridges et al. 2014; Brooke et al. 2015). As such, I investigate
the possibility of an alternative regulatory policy that achieves the same objective
5.5. Policy Impact Analysis 93
without requiring banks to hold additional capital.
The policy I consider is motivated by the fact that a bank does not internalise
the impact of its activities on the build-up of systemic risk in the financial system
(Acharya 2009; Wagner 2010). I model this policy by defining a similarity measure
Sb for bank b relative to the rest of the financial system as:
Sb = ∑
a∈Bb
|F(b)∩F(a)|
max(|F(b)|, |F(a)|) (5.7)
Where Bb is the set of banks registered in the same sector(s) as bank b and
F(x) gives the set of firms with lending relationship(s) with bank x. I further define
∆Sb f as the additional increase in the similarity for a bank b conditional on a credit
transaction with a firm f . Finally, I implement a simple framework such that firms
are more likely to transact with banks having lower ∆Sb f . Thus, deviating from the
random bank-firm link formation process outlined in subsection 5.2.1. In particular,
the framework is such that given ∆Sb f a firm f transacts with bank b with probability
ωb f defined as:
ωb f =
1/∆Sb f
∑
a∈Bb
1/∆Sb f
∆Sb f = Sb f −Sb (5.8)
Following the intuition developed in Equation 5.7, I define Sb f as:
Sb f = ∑
a∈Bb
|(F(b)∪ f )∩F(a)|
max(|(F(b)∪ f )|, |F(a)|) (5.9)
A possible way of implementing this policy is for a central bank to compute
∆Sb f and translate this into a tax that reduces lending activities of banks with high
∆Sb f . This could be in the form of a model that essentially increases the lending
rates from such banks, which would ultimately incentive firms to transact with those
banks with low ∆Sb f . Poledna and Thurner (2016), for instance, adopt a similar
structure where the interest rate proposed by a bank is proportional to its ”debtrank”.
However, I do not model this translation since our interest lies in understanding the
effectiveness of the policy rather than its implementation details.
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Figure 5.12: Idiosyncratic and systemic risk as a function of φs. Diamonds: Without
policy. Squares: With policy. Results refer to 300 simulations with each simulation
spanning 2500 time periods.
I compare the stability impact of this policy relative to our benchmark model
using the same initial configuration and random number seed for respective simula-
tions. The plots in Figure 5.12 show that the policy is effective at reducing systemic
risk. This follows from the fact that the policy induces a self-arranging network
topology between banks and firms that promotes dissimilarity in the financial sys-
tem even with increasing diversification which ultimately reduces the build-up of
systemic risk. Although, idiosyncratic risk is relatively higher with our policy how-
ever the benefit of this risk reducing with increasing diversification is preserved.
5.6 Conclusion
Banks are increasingly diversifying their balance sheets across several assets in or-
der to reduce their individual riskiness (Battiston et al. 2012b; Wagner 2010). Ac-
cordingly, the true consequences of diversification particularly as it affects the sta-
bility of the financial system and the wider economy is actively being discussed by
policy makers and academics (Battiston et al. 2012b; Caccioli et al. 2014; Tasca
et al. 2014; Wagner 2008; Wagner 2010). I contribute to this discussion by study-
ing the impact of diversification on systemic (i.e. likelihood of joint failures) and
idiosyncratic risk (i.e. risk of a one-off failure) using an agent based model that
couples the financial system and the real economy. This approach not only leads to
the emergence of a constantly evolving interbank and bank-firm network but also
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results in the emergence of shocks from the real sector that can be transmitted to the
financial system via the evolving multi-layered network of bank-firm and bank-bank
lending relationships.
Our findings suggest that diversification reduces idiosyncratic risk but in-
creases systemic risk. I note that this finding leads to a higher cost for the soci-
ety which ultimately results in a negative feedback on the real economy in terms
of lower aggregate credit volume. Moreover, we find the emergence of a ”robust
yet fragile” behaviour from the model especially for low levels of diversification.
This behaviour has been shown in several studies to characterise the financial sys-
tem (Caccioli et al. 2014; Gai and Kapadia 2010) and simply implies that while the
probability of a systemic crisis is low, the impact is however widespread (i.e. a large
part of the financial system is affected) whenever it occurs. I then investigated the
impact of introducing preferential attachment into the lending links of the bank-firm
network and find that the risk profiles remain essentially the same as in the original
model. However, we find that preferential attachment increases idiosyncratic risk
but significantly reduces system risk in the financial system.
I then investigated the effectiveness of a regulatory policy that permits diversi-
fication without exacerbating systemic risk but does not require banks to hold ad-
ditional capital. The policy essentially promotes bank-firm credit transactions that
result in the smallest increase in the similarity between banks in the financial sys-
tem. I show that this policy is effective at reducing systemic risk whilst keeping the
benefit of diversification of reducing idiosyncratic risk. This is because the policy
induces a self-arranging network topology between banks and firms that promotes
dissimilarity in the financial system even with increasing diversification which ulti-
mately reduces the build-up of systemic risk.
Finally, our analysis side-steps the impact of correlation between sectors even
though correlation can endogenously arise in the model particularly during periods
of economic downturns. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to extend this work
to explicitly characterise the stability of the financial system on the joint impact of
diversification and correlation. However, I note that the impact of correlation would
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be irrelevant at the point where each bank becomes fully diversified across all the
sectors.
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Parmeter Description Value
Model Parameters
Nh Number of households 800
N f Number of firms 100
Nb Number of banks 20
Ns Number of sectors 20
φs Bank diversification level Variable
τ Loan & interest repayment 0.05
η Firm dividend 0.25
rm Interest rate threshold 0.05
µ Interest rate adjustment parameter 0.01
Mib Number of banks approached on the interbank market 2
M f Number of firms approached on the consumption market 2
α Labour productivity 0.02
Ch Consumption budget 0.8
ψ Labour turnover probability 0.05
γy Production adjustment parameter 0.1
γp Price adjustment parameter 0.1
z Wage adjustment parameter 0.001
ζ Reserve requirement 0.03
ξ Resolution overhead 1
Table 5.1: Model simulation parameters
Chapter 6
Policy Interactions
6.1 Introduction
Banking regulation and supervision has witnessed radical changes since the recent
global financial crisis. The crisis exposed the inherent limitations of existing reg-
ulatory frameworks and precipitated calls for additional and new policy overlays
to improve the stability of the financial system. The result has been a paradigm
shift from policies focused exclusively on achieving micro-prudential resilience to
macroprudential policies that place more emphasis on system-wide stability espe-
cially beyond the context of the financial system. In this light, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed new banking regulations namely Basel
III to address the shortcomings of the previous Basel II regulatory framework (see
Basel Committee On Banking Supervision 2011).
Moreover, the question of how to resolve a failed financial institution also came
under serious controversial debates in the wake of the financial crisis with some
policy makers promoting government bail-outs while others adopted the use of bail-
ins. For instance, the United States government faced increased backlash over its
use of tax-payers’ money to fund bail-out rescue missions for certain banks deemed
”too big to fail” (TBTF) with many suggesting that such bail-outs only provided
more incentives for such banks to take on additional risks with the reassurance that
tax-payers would eventually bear the cost (Nagourney 2009). On the counter side,
proponents for bailouts have pointed to the contagion risk channel embedded with
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a bail-in resolution regime. To further complicate matters, policy makers still must
address the traditional question of what monetary policy rule to implement in-order
to adjust the interest rate in response to changes in inflation and economic activity.
For instance, a central bank whose sole objective is to control the inflation level may
choose to adopt an inflation-targeting monetary policy.
The combination of these regulatory policies (i.e. monetary, resolution and
macroprudential) without understanding the feedback system underlying their in-
teractions may contradict the initial objective of the regulator and even result in
unintended consequences on financial stability and the wider economy. Addressing
these questions is desirable from the point of view of economic policy makers and
world leaders who according to Farmer and Foley (2009) were said to be ”flying the
economy by the seat of their pants” during the recent financial crisis.
Unfortunately, these regulatory policies have mostly been studied in isolation
until recently thus bearing the fallacy of composition risk. In particular, the litera-
ture on prudential regulation focused mostly on capital adequacy requirement CAR
has received the widest attention from academia and industry over the last decade.
Cosimano and Hakura (2011), Gauthier et al. (2012), Miles et al. (2013), Ryo et
al. (2010), and Slovik and Courne`de (2011) provide empirical evidence of a posi-
tive impact of the CAR instrument on the economy and the stability of the financial
system while Angelini and Clerc (2011), Boissay (2011), Derviz (2013), and Dib
(2010) employ general equilibrium/dynamic stochastic general equilibrium based
models to also investigate the qualitative impact of prudential regulation on the
economy and financial stability. A growing number of recent studies have adopted
the use of agent based computation models for macro/financial economics studies
(Ashraf et al. 2011; Cincotti et al. 2010; Dawid and Hoog 2015; Dosi et al. 2015;
Krug et al. 2014; Raberto and Teglio 2012; Tesfatsion 2005). The literature on
bankruptcy resolution is rather sparse. Siegert et al. (2015) provides a concise re-
view of the methodologies for estimating the implicit subsidies enjoyed by TBTF
banks concisely while Klimek et al. (2015) provides a comparative assessment of
the macroeconomic impact of different resolution regimes. A recent trend of re-
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search work attempt to understand the interaction of alternative macroprudential
regulations and monetary policy (Agenor et al. 2013; Angelini et al. 2012; An-
geloni and Faia 2013; Beau et al. 2012; Napoletano et al. 2015; Spencer 2014; Suh
2014).
I contribute to this strand of literature by studying the long term economic
impact of different bank resolution instruments used by regulators in the presence
of prevailing monetary and macroprudential policies using an agent based model
that couples the real economy and the financial system. Our choice of agent based
modelling is informed by the need to capture the economy as a complex evolv-
ing system lacking central co-ordination. Thus allowing for the emergence of out-
of-equilibrium phenomena at the macro level such as financial crises (Bookstaber
2012; Tesfatsion 2005) which cannot simply be observed by aggregating over a rep-
resentative agent as typified in the alternative traditional neoclassical equilibrium
models. These models are not suitable for modelling the emergence of unforeseen
macro-properties from complex interactions due to the assumptions of rationality,
representative agents and equilibrium that facilitate their mathematical tractability.
Some critiques have even argued that the very notion of a crisis and the use of
representative agents, equilibrium and assumption of rationality is by nature contra-
dictory (Fagiolo and Roventini 2012; Farmer and Foley 2009)
Our agent based model implements a self-organising closed economy popu-
lated by heterogeneous agents including firms, households, banks and a central bank
interacting within different markets with bounded rationality. Households interact
with firms in the labour and consumption market while firms and banks interact
within the credit market. The central bank is responsible for setting monetary and
macroprudential policies whilst also handling the resolution of failed banks. I con-
sider Basel II and Basel III as the possible prudential frameworks, bailout, bail-in,
purchase & assumption (P&A) as the alternative resolution tools and single, dual
and triple rules respectively targeting inflation, unemployment & inflation, unem-
ployment, inflation & credit volume as the alternative monetary policy rules avail-
able to the central bank. These complex interactions lacking central coordination
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result in the emergence of recurrent phenomena observed in real economies. Specif-
ically, the model can reproduce economic trends found in Okun (Prachowny 1993)
and Beveridge curves (Nickell et al. 1960). Moreover, we observe the emergence
of alternation of booms and recession in aggregate output, power law distribution
of firm sizes (Axtell 2001) and realistic co-movements of macroeconomic variables
namely unemployment, inflation and the nominal interest rate.
We find that Basel III does not always improve the stability of the financial
system relative to Basel II. Specifically, we find that Basel III produces more bank
defaults when the central bank follows an inflation targeting monetary rule but re-
duces the frequency of defaults if the monetary policy rule also responds to changes
in unemployment and credit volume. Moreover, we find that the bailout regime re-
sults in the worst performance in terms of unemployment and output relative to other
investigated resolution regimes. Also, we observe the least bankruptcy frequency
under a P&A regime due to the emergence of bigger and more stable banks that
are better able to absorb losses originating from loan defaults. Finally, we find that
the Basel III components are not addictive under a P&A regime since this regime
decreases the number of banks which further reinforces the reduction in lending
already implied by the additional regulatory constraints on the active banks. Fur-
thermore, the performance of Basel III framework is mainly characterised by the
capital overlay components namely capital adequacy ratio and conservation buffer
while the additional constraint imposed by leverage requirement does not seem to
have any reasonable impact on the performance of the framework.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, I describe the
model dynamics with detailed explanations of the resolution tools, Basel frame-
works and monetary policies. I discuss the simulation results in Section 6.4 and
summarise our findings in Section 6.5.
6.2 Model
I implement an extension of the model developed in the previous chapter to include
a central bank agent that sets and enforce rules for bankruptcy resolution, prudential
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and monetary policies. Moreover, I make changes to the firm model to capture the
influence of interest rate. Figure 6.1 provides a high-level view of the agents and
their interactions within the model. The model is implemented to ensure stock
flow consistency such that every liability on an agent’s balance sheet is an asset on
some other agent’s books (see Figure 6.2, for a detailed description of each agent’s
balance sheet). As in the previous chapter, I validate the model against its ability
to reproduce several stylized facts reported in real economies. We find that the
model can reproduce economic trends described in Okun (Prachowny 1993) and
Beveridge curves (Nickell et al. 1960). Moreover, we observe the emergence of
alternation of booms and recession in aggregate output, power law distribution of
firm sizes (Axtell 2001) and realistic co-movements of macroeconomic variables
namely unemployment, inflation and the nominal interest rate. See Section 6.3 for
an elaborate discussion on the model calibration and validation.
Figure 6.1: High-level view of Agents interactions. The central bank sets
bankruptcy resolution, prudential and monetary rules
6.2.1 Firm behaviour changes
1. Each firm randomly approaches Mb banks for loans to cover its liquidity
shortfall i.e. max(0,Ldi (t)Wi(t)−Ci), where Wi & Ci denote the pay and cash
of firm i. The bank offering the best interest rate is selected. Banks propose
interest rates for each firm using an increasing function of the firm’s financial
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(a) Bank’s balance sheet (b) Firm’s balance sheet
(c) Household’s balance sheet (d) Central bank’s balance sheet
Figure 6.2
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fragilityLi defined as the ratio of its total debt to its cash i.e.
rb,i(t) = r0(t)(1+ ε)[1+ tanh(µLi(t))] (6.1)
Moreover, a firm demands only a certain percentage Φ of the initial required
loan if the interest rate exceeds rm, where Φ is the credit contraction parame-
ter and rm is the maximum interest rate. i.e.
LoanDemandi(t) =
ΦLoanRequired if rb,i > rmLoanRequired otherwise (6.2)
2. Each firm updates its wages for the next period using similar heuristics as in
the production & price update rule i.e.
W Ti (t+1) =Wi(t)[1+ γwεΓi(t)] i f
 Yi(t)< Di(t)Pi(t)> 0 (6.3)
Wi(t+1) =Wi(t)[1− γwuΓi(t)] i f
 Yi(t) = Di(t)Pi(t)< 0
where u= 1−ε is the unemployment rate and γw = zγp is the wage adjustment
parameter; Pi(t) = min(Di(t),Yi(t)pi(t)−Wi(t)Yi(t) is the profit of firm i at
time t and γi is drawn from the uniform distribution U [0,1]. The intuition
behind the above rules is that a firm would only consider increasing its wages
for the next time step only if it makes a profit and the expected demand is met.
Moreover, the firm would reduce its wages if it makes a loss and the demand
for its goods is lower than expected. The wage adjustment parameter is also
dependent on the level of unemployment such that low unemployment (high
employment) would lead to higher wage increments and vice versa.
6.2.2 Monetary policies
The central bank follows Taylor (1993) rules to adjust the interest rate r0 in response
to changes in inflation & economic activity 1. The idea behind the rules is straight-
forward, if i is the short-term interest rate and i∗ some target rate, deviations of i
1By setting the interest rate at which bank can borrow from the discount window, the central
bank automatically sets a ceiling for interbank rates and the credit market baseline rate in the model
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from i∗ is set proportional to the deviation of another variable z from the desired
target z∗ i.e.
i− i∗= θz(z− z∗) (6.4)
where θz is the adjustment parameter. In the model, I focus on inflation, unemploy-
ment and credit growth as target variables and discuss them under the following
headings:
Single mandate rule(T Rpi ) The baseline rate r0 is updated by only considering the
deviation of the prevailing inflation rate from the desired target.
ln(1+ r0,t) = max{ln(1+ r∗)+φpi(ln(1+pit)− ln(1+pi∗)),0} (6.5)
Dual mandate rule(T Rpi,u) The central bank sets the baseline rate r0 in response
to deviations of the prevailing inflation and unemployment rates from their desired
targets (Dosi et al. 2015).
ln(1+r0,t)=max{ln(1+r∗)+φpi(ln(1+pit)−ln(1+pi∗))+φu(ln(1+u∗)−ln(1+u)),0}
(6.6)
Triple mandate rule(T Rpi,u,c) As in (Napoletano et al. 2015), I consider a variant
of the Taylor rule where the central bank considers the change in credit volume as
well as the deviations of the prevailing inflation and unemployment rates from their
desired targets in setting r0.
ln(1+r0,t)=max{ln(1+r∗)+φpi(ln(1+pit)−ln(1+pi∗))+φu(ln(1+u∗)−ln(1+u))
+ ln(
Ct
Ct−1
)φc ,0} (6.7)
6.2.3 Macroprudential policy
Most central banks around the world have built their macroprudential policy based
on recommendations specified in the Basel framework issued by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision(BCBS). In this work, I would consider the earlier Basel
II and the more recent Basel III frameworks. Essentially, both frameworks seek to
make the financial system more resilient to adverse shocks in a way that minimises
negative spill-overs to the real economy.
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Basel II The original Basel II framework requires a bank to hold total capital that
is at least 2% of its risk weighted assets (RWA) 2. In other words, the framework
defines the minimum capital requirement for a bank at time t as:
CAR2 =
TotalCapitalt
RWAt
≥ χ2, (6.8)
with χ2 = 2%. In our model, the assets of each bank including loans to firms, inter-
bank loans and cash are weighted based on specifications in the Basel framework in
which a weight is assigned to an asset class based on its probability of default such
that a safe asset like cash is assigned a weight of zero 3.
Basel III The Basel committee developed this new framework to correct the short-
comings associated with Basel II. In the following, I discuss the components of the
Basel III framework that are relevant to our analysis.
1. Minimum capital requirement (CAR3): Under Basel III, banks are required
to hold capital that is at least χ3 = 4.5% of their risk weighted assets (up from
2% specified in Basel II). Also, the only qualifying capital under this new
framework is common equity (Tier 1).
CAR3 =
Tier1t
RWAt
≥ χ3 (6.9)
2. Liquidity requirement (LCR): A bank that is adequately capitalised can still
be exposed to liquidity risk due to maturity mismatch between its lendings
and borrowings. Under Basel III, the BCBS specifies a minimum liquidity
coverage ratio in-order to improve the resilience of banks to short term liq-
uidity risk and prevent the need for fire sales. In this framework, a bank is
expected to hold an adequate stock of unencumbered high quality liquid as-
sets (HQLA) that can cover for its expected net cash outflows (NCOF) over a
2While total capital includes other forms of qualifying and supplementary capital in addition to
core equity, I only consider the latter in our model due to the simplified nature of our banks’ balance
sheets
3Interbank loans and firm credits are assigned weights of 100% respectively while cash is as-
signed a weight of 0% in our model
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30 day stress scenario 4 i.e.
LCR =
HQLAt
NCOFt
≥ γ, (6.10)
with γ = 1. The stress scenario simulates funding withdrawals and loan de-
faults by specifying run-off and default rates for liabilities and assets respec-
tively. Specifically, interbank funding are assumed not to be rolled over (i.e.
vLb = 100% run-off rate) while retail deposits are assumed to run-off at a
vd = 10%. rate. On the asset side, interbank loans are given default rates of
vLb = 100%, Loans to firms are assumed to default at a rate of vL f = 50%
while cash has 0% default rate . Hence, the expected cash outflows E[C−t ]
and inflows E[C+t ] are computed as:
E[C−t ] =C
−
t +
n
∑
i=1
vili,t =C−t + vdDt + vLbL
−
b,t
E[C+t ] =C
+
t −
n
∑
i=1
viai,t =C+t − vL f L f ,t− vLbL+b (6.11)
where C−t refers to due interest and loan payments while C+t denotes interest
and loan receipts, the net cash outflow (NCOFt) is:
NCOFt = E[C−t ]−E[C+t ] (6.12)
3. Capital conservation buffer(CConB): Basel II is procyclical in the sense that
a bank can easily satisfy the CAR requirement during upswings in the finan-
cial cycle. However, a downward change in the cycle can quickly erode its
capital and cause it to deleverage in-order to comply with the CAR. CConB
addresses this procyclicality by requiring a bank to hold additional 2.5% core
capital above the regulatory minimum of 4.5% of RWA such that the bank
would have more capital to drawn from during ”bad” times. Moreover, in-
stead of having to deleverage as in CAR, the bank is forced to retain future
earnings (i.e. cut dividend payments) whenever it fails to comply with this
requirement. This additional capital can be used to absorb the losses until the
conservation buffer is restored without triggering a deleveraging cycle.
4A time period in our model typically corresponds to 1 month
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4. Counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB): This serves as a macroprudential in-
strument that allows regulators to extend the capital conservation buffer by an
additional 2.5% during upswings in the financial cycle and to suspend it dur-
ing downturns in the financial cycle. The CCyB achieves the broader aim of
protecting the financial system from periods of excessive credit growth often
associated with the build of system-wide risk. I model the CCyB as a linear
function of the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term
trend estimated using a linear regression model based on data from the last
100 periods. Formally, the additional CCyB at time t is defined as:
CCyBt =

0 if Gt ≤ J
(Gt− J)
(H− J) ∗0.025 if J ≤ Gt ≤ H
0.025 otherwise
(6.13)
Where J and H denote the adjustment thresholds specified as J = 2 and H =
10 in the Basel framework.
5. Leverage requirement (LR): The leverage requirement places an upper bound
on the growth size of a bank’s balance sheet to prevent massive deleverag-
ing during periods of downswings in the real economy. It is like the risk
weighted CAR approaches discussed above except that the assets are now
non-risk weighted i.e.
LR =
Tier1t
TotalAssetst
≥ ω, (6.14)
with ω = 3%.
6. Capital surcharges for SIBs. Banks tend to increase in size and complex-
ity in-order to take advantage of the implicit subsidies associated with the
so-called ”Too Big to Fail” status. This causes a moral hazard problem that
leads to increased risk taking, interconnectedness and transactions via the
payment system which may make increase the fragility of the financial sys-
tem. Hence, the Basel committee has proposed imposing additional capital
6.2. Model 109
requirements to a bank based on its level of systemic relevance (Basel Com-
mittee On Banking Supervision 2013). In their approach, banks are assigned
weighted scores using five indicators including size, interconnectedness, sub-
stitutability, cross-jurisdictional activity and complexity. Based on the scores,
the Basel committee proposes that four equally sized buckets are set between
a chosen cut-off score and the maximum score. The banks are then placed
in different buckets and each bucket is assigned a specific capital addon as
shown in Table 6.1. The balance sheet composition of our banks only allows
Bucket
Score
Range
Minimum additional
loss absorbency capital
5(empty) above D 3.5%
4 C-D 2.5%
3 B-C 2.0%
2 A-B 1.5%
1 cut-off A 1.0%
5
Table 6.1: Capital surcharges for SIBs
us to capture the first three (i.e. size, interconnectedness and substitutability)
in computing the systemic score of a bank i.e.
Scorei,t =
1
3
3
∑
k=1
ski,t (6.15)
where each indicator (ski,t) is defined as follows:
(a) Size. The size indicator weighs each bank based on its balance sheet
size relative to the whole system i.e.
s1i,t =
TotalAssetsi,t
∑nj=1 TotalAssets j,t
(6.16)
5Banks whose systemic scores fall below the cut-off are not required to hold additional capital.
The 5th bucket is initially empty and serves to disincentives banks with high systemic scores from
becoming even more systemically relevant. A new empty bucket would be required if the 5th bucket
becomes populated
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(b) Interconnectedness. This provides a measure for the systemic relevance
of a bank on the interbank network by summing the relative volume
of funds granted and received by each bank via the interbank market
together with the proportion of the bank’s assets funded by interbank
borrowings. Formally;
s2i,t =
(
LoansIBi,t
∑nj=1 LoansIBj,t
+
CreditsIBi,t
∑nj=1CreditsIBj,t
+
CreditsIBi,t
∑nj=1 TotalLiabilities j,t
)/
3
(6.17)
(c) Substitutability. This gives an indication of the relevance of a bank in
ensuring proper functioning of the payment system. I measure the sub-
stitutability of a bank as the relative cash transactions sent by the bank
aggregated over a period t.
s3i,t =
PaymentsSenti,t
∑nj=1 PaymentsSenti,t
(6.18)
6.2.4 Bankruptcy resolution
The central bank is responsible for resolving a failed bank. A bank is said to have
failed whenever its equity position falls below zero. In this analysis, I am interested
in understanding how the monetary policies and Basel regulations discussed above
interact with following resolution strategies used mostly during 2008 financial cri-
sis:
Purchase & Assumption (P&A). I follow the implementation of a P&A used in
Klimek et al. (2015) which involves the transfer of a failed bank’s operations to
other healthy banks in the system. Specifically, the failed bank’s assets and liabili-
ties are acquired by each of the healthy banks proportional to their level of equity.
Thus, it is important that households’ deposit accounts and firm loan accounts are
registered with the assuming banks to ensure model consistency.
Bailout. In a bailout, the government re-capitalises the insolvent bank with a sum
sufficient to cover for its negative equity position and a small overhead ξ to ensure
proper resumption of the bank’s operations using taxes received from firms, banks
& households. Hence, a bailout ensures continued operation of the failed bank in
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contrast to a P&A. I do not explicitly include a government agent in our model
instead I impose a one-time levy over all households and firms proportional to their
wealth and liquidity respectively in-order to raise the required bailout cash.
Bailin. A bail in involves restructuring the balance sheet of the failed bank such that
some of its liabilities (loans & deposits) are converted into equity. I implement this
by subtracting a one-time levy required to cover for negative equity position and a
small overhead ξ to ensure continued bank operations from its deposits and inter-
bank liabilities proportional to their sizes. Hence, the losses are borne by the bank
customers and other banks that have provided loan to it on the interbank market in
exchange for ownership rights in the bank.
6.3 Model Calibration and Validation
I validate the model against its ability to reproduce some stylized facts reported in
real economies using a baseline scenario that combines a bailout resolution regime,
Basel II and a single mandate monetary policy. In Figure 6.3, I show the emer-
gent macroeconomic dynamics from a representative simulation using the bench-
mark scenario. Although, the agent based model is simplified, it still comes close
to displaying out-of-equilibrium phenomena observed in real economics based on
self-organising and complex interactions between the heterogeneous agents in an
evolving system lacking central coordination without recourse to over-simplified
assumptions of rationality, representative agents and general equilibrium.
Specifically, we observe the emergence of alternation of booms and recessions
in aggregate output as reported in national GDP data in Figure 6.3a and Figure 6.4a,
these business cycles have been found to endogenously arise when the assumptions
of perfect ex ante coordination and walrasian market clearing are relaxed (Gualdi
et al. 2015; Lengnick 2013). We observe in Figure 6.3a that while no assump-
tions of market clearing equilibrium has been imposed the economy self-organises
towards full potential (i.e. productivity(α)×Nh). Figure 6.3c shows that unemploy-
ment rate ranges between 0% & 12%, which comes to close to what is observed in
reality. Finally, inflation rate oscillates around the central bank’s 2% target with
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Parmeter Description Value
Model parameters
Nh Number of households 800
N f Number of firms 100
Nb Number of banks 20
τ Loan & interest repayment 0.05
Φ Credit contraction parameter 0.75
η Firm dividend 0.25
rm Interest rate threshold 0.05
µ Interest rate adjustment parameter 0.01
Mb Number of banks approached on the credit market 2
Mib Number of banks approached on the interbank market 2
M f Number of firms approached on the consumption market 2
α Labour productivity 0.02
Ch Consumption budget 0.8
ψ Labour turnover probability 0.05
γy Production adjustment parameter 0.1
γp Price adjustment parameter 0.1
z Wage adjustment parameter 0.001
Macroprudential policy parameters
ζ Reserve requirement 0.03
ω Leverage requirement 0.03
γ Liquidity requirement 1
χ2 Minimum capital requirement for Basel II 0.02
χ3 Minimum capital requirement for Basel III 0.045
CConB Capital conservation buffer 0.025
J Minimum adjustment threshold for CCyB 0.2
H Maximum adjustment threshold for CCyB 1
Monetary policy parameters
pi∗ Target inflation rate 0.02
u∗ Target unemployment rate 0.05
r∗ Target nominal interest rate 0.02
φpi Inflation adjustment parameter 0.15
φu Unemployment adjustment parameter 0.11
φc Credit adjustment parameter 0.07
Bankruptcy resolution parameters
ξ Resolution overhead 1
Table 6.2: Model simulation parameters
6.3. Model Calibration and Validation 113
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
t
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
ou
pu
t
(a)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
t
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
N
om
in
al
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
(b)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
t
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
(c)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
t
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
In
fla
tio
n 
ra
te
(d)
Figure 6.3: Emergent macroeconomic dynamics from a representative simulation
using the baseline model. (a) Real output (i.e. adjusted for inflation) (c) Unem-
ployment rate (d) baseline interest rate set by the central bank and (e) Inflation rate
measured as the growth rate of the average prices across all firms.
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occasional deflationary periods while the baseline interest rate maintains ergodicity
around a reasonable range over a long period of time in Figure 6.3d and Figure 6.3b
respectively.
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Figure 6.4: Emergent macroeconomic phenomena from a representative simulation
using the baseline model. (a) Nominal output (b) Okun’s law (c) Beveridge curve
(d) Power-law firm size distribution
Furthermore, we observe the emergence of other interesting macroeconomic
phenomena from the decentralised model dynamics in Figure 6.4. The top right
panel shows a negative correlation between change in output (∆Y = Yt −Yt+1) and
change in unemployment (∆U =Ut−Ut+1) consistent with Okun’s law (Prachowny
1993). Beveridge’s curve is shown to emerge from the model’s labour dynamics
in Figure 6.4c i.e. a negative relationship between vacancy rate (measured as the
ratio of job openings to the number of employable households) and unemployment
rate (Nickell et al. 1960) 6. Finally, we observe the emergence of a power law
6While the negative correlation between the two variables seems low, our analysis shows that it
is statically significant i.e. the p-value is less than .05
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distribution of firm sizes in Figure 6.4d consistent with empirical findings in real
economies (Axtell 2001).
6.4 Results and Discussion
I provide the model parameters in Table 6.2 and then the comparative analysis
of the interactive impact of the regulatory tools discussed above including mone-
tary policies, Basel regulations and resolution regimes relative to our benchmark
case 7. Specifically, I first consider the joint impact of the new Basel III com-
ponents and then study the impact of each new component separately by isolat-
ing it from the regulatory tools. As already mentioned above, the benchmark
case I consider includes (Basel II, T Rpi & Bailout). I measure the performance
of each system in terms of the fragility of banks (BD) (measured as the average
bank default rate), total credit volume (CV), total asset loss in the financial system
(AL= TotalSystemLiabilities−TotalSystemAssets), output(Y) and unemployment
(U). Results refer 300 Monte Carlos’ simulation runs, each spanning 2400 time
periods 8.
6.4.1 Basel III versus Basel II
In this section, I compare the performance of the Basel III regulatory framework
relative to Basel II in terms of BD,CV,AL,Y & U over all possible combinations of
the monetary and resolution policies. In the following paragraphs, I use the term
”less conservative” monetary rules to denote a transition from a single to a dual or
triple mandate monetary rule.
Bank defaults (BD) We find that transitioning to a less conservative monetary rule
generally reduces bank defaults for both Basel regimes regardless of the resolution
tool. However, we observe that Basel III does not always result in lower bank de-
7The parameters are consistent with those adopted by most national central banks and regulators,
however, I have adjusted some of the parameters by a factor of 10−1 to be consistent with our model’s
timescale, unit of money and households’ productivity
8A time period in our model typically corresponds to one month, hence a 2400 time period is
200 years. Hence it is reasonable to view the results of this work as the long-term performance of
the system.
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faults compared with Basel II. In particular, we find that Basel III results in more
bank defaults than Basel II when the central bank uses an inflation targeting mone-
tary rule but reduces the frequency of defaults as the monetary policy rule becomes
less conservative irrespective of the adopted resolution tool. This stems from the
fact that indexing the interest rate to only changes in inflation as in the T Rpi mon-
etary rule worsens the already tightening conditions on credit in Basel III’s frame-
work (see the following discussion on credit volume), which essentially triggers
more downturns in the real sector since interest rates are not responding to the pre-
vailing economic conditions in terms of unemployment and credit volume as in the
dual & triple mandate monetary policies. The net effect of this would be an increase
in the level of ”loan write-offs” and thus increased probability of bankruptcy. Fi-
nally, we observe that a bailout resolution strategy results in the most frequent bank
defaults while the lowest occurrence of bank defaults is achieved in a P&A regime.
A possible explanation for this is the emergence of bigger banks that have absorbed
other failed banks through a P&A. These banks have been shown to act essentially
as stop gaps for bankruptcy cascades by Caccioli et al. (2011) and Gai et al. (2011).
Another possibility is related to do way the cost of resolving failed banks is spread.
Spreading the cost across all firms and households as in a bailout rather than a subset
of the agents is more likely to plunge the economy into a recession thus triggering
more bank defaults.
Credit volume (CV) The volume of allocated funds on the credit market is smaller
in Basel III than Basel II for all combinations of resolution and monetary policies
investigated due to greater credit tightening conditions stemming from the addi-
tional capital requirements in Basel III. Furthermore, we observe an upward trend
in the volume of allocated credit in both Basel regimes and across all studied res-
olution mechanisms as the monetary policy becomes less conservative. This is so
because the less conservative monetary rules increase the sensitivity of the inter-
est rate to prevailing economic conditions which essentially reduces loan rationing
across firms according to Equation 6.2. Moreover, we find that combining a bailout
resolution with the triple mandate (T Rpi,u,c) policy produces the best result. This
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Table 6.3: Normalised bank default rates. Monetary rules: Single-mandate rule
(T Rpi ), Dual-mandate rule (T Rpi,u), Triple-mandate rule (T Rpi,u,c). Basel III over-
lays: CAR3 capital adequacy ratio, CConB capital conservation buffer, CCyB
counter cyclical buffer, LR leverage requirement, LCR liquidity coverage ratio &
SIBs capital surcharges for systemic important banks. Less conservative mone-
tary rule reduces bank defaults. Basel III does not always result in less bank
defaults than Basel II. P&A regime results in the least bank defaults. Standard
errors are shown in parenthesis.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.6249 0.4225 0.5468 0.3123 0.2113 0.1025 0.0572 0.0394
(0.0237) (0.0202) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0112) (0.0084) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Basel III 1.0725 0.5577 0.3674 0.5862 0.2971 0.2017 0.1044 0.0574 0.0408
(0.0217) (0.0168) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0101) (0.0078) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
can easily be understood if one puts the preceding intuition together with the fact
that firms are likely to request more loans in a bailout since they share directly in
the burden of resolving failed banks.
Table 6.4: Normalised credit volume. Basel III results in less credit transactions
than Basel II. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 1.1602 1.1606 0.9656 1.1459 1.1522 0.8497 1.1314 1.1503
(0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0027)
Basel III 0.9564 1.1279 1.1343 0.9627 1.1354 1.1417 0.8345 1.1287 1.1477
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Asset loss (AL) I measure the total asset loss as total systemic liabilities less total
systemic assets. We find that the value of this loss reduces in both Basel configu-
rations as the monetary policy becomes less conservative. This is most likely due
to the fact that the loan demand from firms is higher since the interest rate is re-
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sponding to the prevailing economic condition. The impact of this is twofold. First,
it results in increased employment that ultimately translates to greater household
wealth which increases consumption, thus reducing the likelihood of firm defaults
which leads to lower ”loan write-offs. Second, higher loan demand would lead to
greater profitability for the banks, which would increase the asset side of their bal-
ance sheets. Furthermore, we observe that Basel III always outperforms Basel II
except when a single mandate rule is used for the monetary policy. Finally, we find
the P&A regime amplifies the magnitude of losses relative to the bail-in & bailout
regime if combined with a single mandate rule. This stems from the fact that the
P&A model may lead to severe disproportional interest payment structure for the
healthy banks which may exacerbate losses if interest rates are not adjusted accord-
ing to prevailing economic conditions.
Table 6.5: Normalised asset loss. P&A regime amplifies the magnitude of losses
relative to the bail-in & bailout regime if combined with a single mandate rule.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.4245 0.5604 1.0657 0.3738 0.5291 1.1236 0.3206 0.4867
(0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0063) (0.0101) (0.0109)
Basel III 1.0205 0.4085 0.5525 1.0718 0.3789 0.5233 1.1221 0.3178 0.4835
(0.0056) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0062) (0.0103) (0.0109)
Output (Y) Basel III results in lower aggregate production output relative to Basel
II for all combinations of monetary policies and resolution strategies I studied. This
arises because of banks cutting lending to firms in a bid to comply with the ad-
ditional capital overlays in Basel III framework, this in turn forces firms to revise
their production plans downward. Also, we find that both Basel configuration re-
spond negatively in terms of reduced output as the monetary policy becomes less
conservative. Moreover, in addition to Klimek et al. (2015) who show that a P&A
performs best when the economy is healthy (i.e. interest rates are low), I also ob-
serve a positive response in output as I move from a bailout to a P&A resolution
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regime regardless of the monetary policy used to set the interest rate. This can be
understood if one considers the fact that in a bailout, the burden of resolving a failed
bank is shared across firms and households which effectively slows down economic
activity in terms of production and consumption. Furthermore, our result suggests
that spreading the resolution cost across only banks as in a P&A may supersede the
model of a bail-in which involves spreading the cost across banks and households’
deposits 9.
Table 6.6: Normalised average output values across experiments. Basel III results in
lower aggregate production output relative to Basel II for all combinations of mon-
etary policies and resolution strategies. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9899 0.9860 1.0006 0.9903 0.9864 1.0003 0.9905 0.9866
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III 0.9743 0.9846 0.9819 0.9951 0.9880 0.9845 0.9987 0.9894 0.9860
(0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Unemployment (U) We find that similar to the observations made for Y, the unem-
ployment rate is higher in Basel III than in Basel II for all systemic combinations in-
vestigated since I use a linear Cobb-Douglas production function as in Equation 5.3.
Also, the P&A resolution regime results in the least unemployment rate following
the same intuition developed in the previous paragraph. Moreover, the T Rpi,u mon-
etary rule seems to be only more effective than the T Rpi rule in a bailout regime for
Basel III but outperforms the T Rpi,u,c for both Basel configurations regardless of the
resolution tool. This is so because responding to unemployment changes as in the
T Rpi,u rule will stimulate the economy to recover faster since a bailout slows down
economic activity due to the way the resolution burden is shared across board by all
firms and households, however, controlling for credit volume at the same time as in
the T Rpi,u,c rule is likely to be counterproductive since it is exactly in this period that
9Households’ deposit accounts are affected whenever interbank loan write-offs are insufficient in
meeting the resolution cost as I do not include deposit insurance in the model
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lending conditions need to be loose. This result further strengthens recent calls for
complex rules to be replaced by simpler regulation (Aikman et al. 2014; Haldane
2012)
Table 6.7: Normalised unemployment rates. Standard errors are shown in parenthe-
sis. Bailout regime results in more unemployment than bail-in and P&A
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 2.0592 2.5533 0.9363 1.9954 2.4881 0.9708 1.9772 2.4658
(0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0153)
Basel III 4.2854 2.6934 3.0353 1.5644 2.2725 2.7147 1.1331 2.1089 2.5447
(0.3389) (0.0432) (0.0349) (0.1365) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0180) (0.0172)
6.4.2 Basel III components
In this section, I study the impact of each component of the Basel III framework
including (CAR3 capital adequacy ratio CConB capital conservation buffer, CCyB
counter cyclical buffer, LR leverage requirement, LCR liquidity coverage ratio &
SIBs capital surcharges for systemic important banks).
We find that the production volume from the system improves significantly
by either eliminating the capital ratio requirement, conservation buffer or capital
surcharges for SIBs in this order. This suggest that the reduction in GDP observed
for Basel III in the previous section is mainly due to these additional capital overlay
components. Furthermore, the impact of the Basel III components is generally more
pronounced under a bailout regime especially the counter-cyclical buffer 10 since
credit demand is higher in this regime (see the discussion in Section 6.4.1).
Although one would expect that eliminating either of the additional capital
overlay components including CAR3 & CConB from the Basel III framework
would exacerbate the frequency of bank defaults, I only found this to be true when
the central bank uses the less conservative monetary policies and either a bail-in
10The counter-cyclical buffer is activated during periods of credit booms to help banks build a
solid capital base during this period and correct the procyclicality in CAR3
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or bailout resolution tool but not P&A. Moreover, the Basel III components do not
appear to be addictive under a P&A regime. A possible explanation for this is that
since the regime results in a decrease in the number of banks in the model, impos-
ing additional regulatory constraints on the available banks would mostly serve to
further reduce lending which may trigger economic recessions.
Table 6.8: Normalised credit volume. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
CAR3, CConB & SIBs are the main components of Basel III. Leverage requirement
(LR) has least impact.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 1.1602 1.1606 0.9656 1.1459 1.1522 0.8497 1.1314 1.1503
(0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0027)
Basel III 0.9564 1.1279 1.1343 0.9627 1.1354 1.1417 0.8345 1.1287 1.1477
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Basel III−CAR3 0.9990 1.1505 1.1530 0.9650 1.1441 1.1481 0.8484 1.1320 1.1492
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0026)
Basel III−CConB 0.9914 1.1452 1.1473 0.9655 1.1390 1.1467 0.8454 1.1275 1.1489
(0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0041) (0.0026)
Basel III−LR 0.9566 1.1281 1.1349 0.9630 1.1353 1.1418 0.8355 1.1287 1.1477
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Basel III−CCyB 0.9572 1.1266 1.1340 0.9639 1.1360 1.1427 0.8357 1.1295 1.1476
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0038) (0.0027)
Basel III−SIBs 0.9705 1.1362 1.1411 0.9625 1.1369 1.1435 0.8440 1.1266 1.1489
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0070) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Basel III−LCR 0.9556 1.1263 1.1336 0.9643 1.1345 1.1426 0.8411 1.1286 1.1469
(0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0037) (0.0028)
Finally, eliminating the capital adequacy requirement results in the greatest
increase in the volume of allocated credit. Also eliminating the additional conser-
vation buffer and capital surcharges for SIBs appears to increase the credit volume.
Nevertheless, isolating these components increases the volume of total systemic
asset lost. The additional constraint on lending imposed by leverage requirement
component does not seem to have any reasonable impact on the performance of the
framework possibly owing to the fact that its impact is already masked by CAR3,
CConB, SIBs.
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6.5 Conclusion
The recent crisis exposed the inherent limitations of existing regulatory frameworks
and precipitated calls for additional policy overlays to further improve the stability
of the financial system and prevent a re-occurrence of the crisis. However, combin-
ing these policy instruments with the existing regulatory policies could contradict
and conflict with the desired objective of the regulator and may even lead to unin-
tended consequences. Addressing this challenge has become imperative to policy
makers, who are left with no other choice but to base their decisions on common
sense and anecdotal analogies to previous crisis (Farmer and Foley 2009).
In this work, I set out to investigate the long-term impact of the resolution tool
used in resolving failed banks in the presence of monetary and macroprudential
policies using an agent based model that couples the real economy and the financial
system. In our model, the central bank follows a monetary rule that indexes inter-
est rate relative to changes in economic conditions including inflation, inflation &
unemployment, inflation, unemployment & credit volume by using a single, dual or
triple mandate rule respectively. Further, I consider Basel II and Basel III regulatory
frameworks as the possible macroprudential tools while bailout, bail-in and P&A
(purchase & assumption) are the possible instruments available to the central bank
for resolving failed banks, which only differ in the way the resolution cost is borne
across the agents.
We find that Basel III does not necessarily result in less bank defaults rela-
tive to Basel II. Specifically, we find that Basel III produces more bank defaults if
the central bank uses the single mandate monetary rule but reduces the frequency
of defaults if the monetary policy rule also responds to changes in unemployment
and credit volume. This stems from the fact that indexing the interest rate to only
changes in inflation would be insufficient to stimulate the economy given the credit
tightening conditions inherent in Basel III’s framework. The net effect would most
likely be increased economic recessions leading to increased probability of bank
failures. Moreover, we find the emergence of a positive relationship between re-
duced bank defaults and asset loss and the transition to the dual and triple monetary
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rules. However, the dual monetary rule supersedes the triple rule in terms of un-
employment during periods of production and consumption setbacks encountered
in a bailout regime since controlling for credit volume in this period is likely to be
counter-productive.
In addition, we find that the bailout regime results in the worst performance
in terms of unemployment and output relative to a bail in and P&A owing to the
fact that the resolution burden is shared across all firms and households implicitly
slowing down production and consumption. Furthermore, we observe the least fre-
quency of bank defaults under a P&A regime mostly due to the emergence of bigger
and more stable banks that are better able to absorb losses from loan defaults. Fi-
nally, I investigated the contribution of each component included in the Basel III
framework. We find that the capital adequacy ratio and conservation buffer com-
ponents are the greatest contributor (i.e. CAR3 & CConB ) to the observed char-
acteristics of the Basel III framework. Furthermore, the Basel III components are
not addictive under a P&A regime since this regime decreases the number of banks
which further reinforces the reduction in lending already implied by the additional
Basel III regulatory constraints on the available banks. Moreover, the additional
constraint on lending imposed by leverage requirement component does not seem
to have any reasonable impact on the performance of the framework possibly owing
to the fact that its impact is already masked by CAR3, CConB and SIBs (capital
surcharges for systemic institutions).
These analyses provide only a subset of the insights that can be gained on the
interaction of regulatory policies using our approach. The model could be extended
in several ways, for instance, I have focused only on insolvency for simplicity, how-
ever banks can also fail due to illiquidity. In fact, including this dynamic is likely
to shed more light on the impact of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Another
possibility is to develop scenarios that allow the combination of a class of instru-
ments, for instance studying the impact of a joint adoption of the bail-in and P&A
resolution policies would be interesting.
Chapter 7
General Conclusion, Policy
Recommendations and Future Work
The bitter experience of the recent global financial crisis exposed the inherent lim-
itation of traditional policy models in characterising non-linear feedback and eco-
nomic downturns associated with systemic financial risk. This thesis attempts to
address these limitations by providing insights into the dynamics underlying emer-
gence of financial crises and proposing effective regulatory policies to mitigate their
causes and consequences. I do this under three major themes associated with sys-
temic risk namely overlapping portfolios, risk diversification and policy interactions
In overlapping portfolios, I study the effect of power law distributions of degree
and balance-sheet size on the stability of the system. I approach this by considering
a model of financial contagion in a bipartite network of assets and banks recently
introduced in the literature, Relative to the benchmark case of banks with homo-
geneous degrees and balance-sheet sizes, we find that if banks have a power-law
degree distribution the system becomes less robust with respect to the initial fail-
ure of a random bank, and that targeted shocks to the most specialised banks (i.e.
banks with low degrees) or biggest banks increases the probability of observing a
cascade of defaults. In contrast, we find that a power-law degree distribution for
assets increases stability with respect to random shocks, but not with respect to tar-
geted shocks. I also study how allocations of capital buffers between banks affects
the system’s stability, and We find that assigning capital to banks in relation to their
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level of diversification reduces the probability of observing cascades of defaults rel-
ative to size based allocations. Finally, I propose a non-capital based policy that
improves the resilience of the system by introducing disassortative mixing between
banks and assets.
I then studied the consequences of diversification on financial stability and
social welfare using an agent based model that couples the real economy and a
financial system. I validate the model against its ability to reproduce several stylized
facts reported in real economies. We find that the risk of an isolated bank failure (i.e.
idiosyncratic risk) is decreasing with diversification. In contrast, the probability of
joint failures (i.e. systemic risk) is increasing with diversification which results in
more downturns in the real sector. We find that the system displays a ”robust yet
fragile” behaviour particularly for low diversification. Moreover, I study the impact
of introducing preferential attachment into the lending relationships between banks
and firms. Finally, I show that a regulatory policy that promotes bank-firm credit
transactions that reduce similarity between banks can improve financial stability
whilst permitting diversification.
Lastly, I provide insights into the long term economic impact of different bank
resolution instruments used by regulators to resolve a failed bank in the presence of
prevailing monetary and macroprudential policies. I did this by considering Basel
II and Basel III as the possible prudential frameworks; Bailout, Bailin, Purchase &
Assumption(P&A) as the alternative resolution tools and single, dual and triple Tay-
lor rules as the alternative monetary policy rules respectively targeting either one or
more of changing economic conditions namely inflation, unemployment and credit
volume. We find that Basel III does not always improve the stability of the financial
system relative to Basel II. Specifically, we find that Basel III produces more bank
defaults when the central bank follows an inflation targeting monetary rule but re-
duces the frequency of defaults if the monetary policy rule also responds to changes
in unemployment and credit volume. Further, we observe that a bailout resolution
strategy results in the most frequent bank defaults while the lowest occurrence of
bank defaults is achieved in a P&A regime for all combinations of monetary and
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prudential policies. Also, I investigated the contribution of each Basel III compo-
nent and find that the performance of Basel III framework is mainly characterised by
the capital adequacy ratio and conservation buffer components while the additional
constraint imposed by leverage requirement does not seem to have any reasonable
impact on the performance of the framework. Moreover, the additional capital over-
lay Basel III components do not appear to be addictive under a P&A regime.
7.1 Policy Recommendations
In this section, I provide the following policy recommendations to mitigate systemic
risk based on findings within the context of the research themes considered in this
thesis.
1. A regulatory policy that assigns capital requirements to the most specialised
banks performs better than random capital assignments when the network
connectivity is high. However, focusing capital requirements on only the
biggest bank does not appear to be effective relative to random assignments
within the context of our model.
2. Diversification level is a more significant factor than size in building capital
based policies especially as network connectivity increases.
3. A policy that promotes disassortative mixing (i.e. connecting the most spe-
cialised banks with the most concentrated assets) improves the resilience of
the system without imposing additional capital requirements on banks.
4. Systemic risk build up can be controlled by using a policy that promotes bank-
firm credit transactions that result in the smallest increase in the similarity
between banks in the financial system.
5. Basel III is less beneficial than Basel II in relation to financial stability if
the central bank uses the single mandate monetary rule but improves stability
if the monetary policy rule also responds to changes in unemployment and
credit volume.
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6. In relation to resolving a failed financial institution, the bailout regime results
in the worst performance in terms of unemployment and output relative to a
bail-in and P&A.
7.2 Future Work: Retail Payment Systems
7.2.1 Bacs Payment Schemes Limited - A Case Study
Since its inception, over 100 billion transactions have been debited or credited to
British bank accounts via Bacs. In 2013 over 5.7 billion UK payments were made
this way with a total value of almost £4.2 trillion (UK Payment Markets - Summary).
Over 3.5 billion Direct Debit payments are processed by Bacs a year and 80 per cent
of British adults have at least one Direct Debit commitment. Nearly 90 per cent of
the UK workforce is paid via Bacs Direct Credit, while it is also the payment method
of choice for a range of other applications such as pension payments, employee
expenses, insurance settlements, dividends and refunds. In 2013 more than 2.14
billion payments were processed using Bacs Direct Credit. Thus, it is imperative to
study these payment networks for the ultimate benefit of businesses and consumers.
7.2.1.1 Research Questions
1. Network topology study, Stress testing and What-if scenario analysis: The in-
tention here is to analyse and describe the Bacs direct credit and direct debit
payment network using established network measures as done for the Mexi-
can payment network. This would give us insight in the global and individual
node characteristics of the payment network. In addition, I intend to study
the effect of random and probable shocks to the system’s dynamics. A com-
mon scenario analysis would be the case when a randomly selected node is
unable to fulfil its payment obligation due to operational difficulties - it will
be interesting to look at the effect this kind of scenario would have on the
system.
2. Identify risk outliers arising from within the direct credit and direct debit pay-
ment schemes: Here, I am concerned with possible operational and credit risk
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that undermine both schemes along with their associated cost to consumers,
businesses and banks. Our aim here is to propose measures which when im-
plemented can mitigate these risks along with the cost involved. Thereby
providing incentives for the further adoption of both schemes.
3. Study the overall impact of Bacs direct credit and direct debit payment
schemes on UK economic growth: I am interested in studying the correla-
tion between the adoption of both schemes and macroeconomic indicators
like GDP, employment etc. Our aim is to provide evidence for the relevant of
both schemes to the UK economy built on sound statistical analysis.
4. Provide evidence of the cost associated with cross ownership concerns be-
tween payment schemes and infrastructural Providers: I note that most pay-
ment schemes are owned and controlled by the banks who also are the main
users of the services and as such have an incentive to minimise cost. How-
ever, this has led to a degree of inertia regarding competition and the pace of
innovation, thereby limiting the options available to the scheme in selecting
infrastructural suppliers. Our aim here is to provide countercyclical sugges-
tions to resolve this challenge.
5. Study the optimal access fee structure and competition strategy for the Direct
debit and Bacs Direct Credit Payment Platform using lessons learned from
the two-sided market theory: While it can be argued that the direct debit and
Bacs direct credit product schemes do not necessarily fit the description of a
traditional two-sided market, our aim here is to remodel the existing theory to
capture peculiarities of the Bacs payment platform. This would enable us to
determine the optimal access fee structure and competition strategy necessary
to increase the transaction volume and revenue from the Bacs platform.
Appendix A
Appendix: Chapter 5
Table A.1: Normalised bank default rates across experiments. Monetary policies:
single-mandate rule T Rpi , dual-mandate rule T Rpi,u & triple-mandate rule T Rpi,u,c.
Basel III overlays: CAR3 capital adequacy ratio, CConB capital conservation
buffer, CCyB counter cyclical buffer, LR leverage requirement, LCR liquidity cov-
erage ratio & SIBs capital surcharges for systemic important banks. Standard
errors are shown in parenthesis
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.6249 0.4225 0.5468 0.3123 0.2113 0.1025 0.0572 0.0394
(0.0237) (0.0202) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0112) (0.0084) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Basel III 1.0725 0.5577 0.3674 0.5862 0.2971 0.2017 0.1044 0.0574 0.0408
(0.0217) (0.0168) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0101) (0.0078) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Basel III−CAR3 1.0239 0.5969 0.3994 0.5636 0.3167 0.2064 0.1023 0.0559 0.0393
(0.0249) (0.0183) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0120) (0.0081) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Basel III−CConB 1.0516 0.5849 0.3868 0.5708 0.3040 0.1986 0.1022 0.0568 0.0399
(0.0238) (0.0184) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0075) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Basel III−LR 1.0693 0.5576 0.3671 0.5862 0.2972 0.2017 0.1042 0.0574 0.0408
(0.0217) (0.0168) (0.0131) (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0078) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Basel III−CCyB 1.0809 0.5571 0.3680 0.5895 0.2988 0.2016 0.1042 0.0574 0.0408
(0.0228) (0.0172) (0.0128) (0.0153) (0.0103) (0.0077) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Basel III−SIBs 1.0439 0.5547 0.3800 0.5923 0.3044 0.1996 0.1029 0.0570 0.0398
(0.0218) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0105) (0.0078) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Basel III−LCR 1.0640 0.5577 0.3682 0.5914 0.2966 0.2008 0.1035 0.0574 0.0408
(0.0221) (0.0170) (0.0132) (0.0149) (0.0101) (0.0079) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
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Table A.2: Normalised average credit volume granted across experiments.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 1.1602 1.1606 0.9656 1.1459 1.1522 0.8497 1.1314 1.1503
(0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0040) (0.0027)
Basel III 0.9564 1.1279 1.1343 0.9627 1.1354 1.1417 0.8345 1.1287 1.1477
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Basel III−CAR3 0.9990 1.1505 1.1530 0.9650 1.1441 1.1481 0.8484 1.1320 1.1492
(0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0026)
Basel III−CConB 0.9914 1.1452 1.1473 0.9655 1.1390 1.1467 0.8454 1.1275 1.1489
(0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0041) (0.0026)
Basel III−LR 0.9566 1.1281 1.1349 0.9630 1.1353 1.1418 0.8355 1.1287 1.1477
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0027)
Basel III−CCyB 0.9572 1.1266 1.1340 0.9639 1.1360 1.1427 0.8357 1.1295 1.1476
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0038) (0.0027)
Basel III−SIBs 0.9705 1.1362 1.1411 0.9625 1.1369 1.1435 0.8440 1.1266 1.1489
(0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0070) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Basel III−LCR 0.9556 1.1263 1.1336 0.9643 1.1345 1.1426 0.8411 1.1286 1.1469
(0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0067) (0.0037) (0.0028)
Table A.3: Normalised mean asset loss across simulations.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.4245 0.5604 1.0657 0.3738 0.5291 1.1236 0.3206 0.4867
(0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0063) (0.0101) (0.0109)
Basel III 1.0205 0.4085 0.5525 1.0718 0.3789 0.5233 1.1221 0.3178 0.4835
(0.0056) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0062) (0.0103) (0.0109)
Basel III−CAR3 1.0090 0.4128 0.5564 1.0712 0.3726 0.5267 1.1272 0.3212 0.4857
(0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0063) (0.0102) (0.0110)
Basel III−CConB 1.0099 0.4148 0.5562 1.0709 0.3775 0.5271 1.1288 0.3217 0.4858
(0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0062) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0062) (0.0103) (0.0109)
Basel III−LR 1.0203 0.4083 0.5526 1.0716 0.3789 0.5236 1.1221 0.3178 0.4835
(0.0056) (0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0062) (0.0103) (0.0109)
Basel III−CCyB 1.0223 0.4043 0.5520 1.0725 0.3789 0.5238 1.1223 0.3174 0.4837
(0.0057) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0064) (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0062) (0.0104) (0.0109)
Basel III−SIBs 1.0132 0.4114 0.5534 1.0735 0.3767 0.5252 1.1254 0.3192 0.4881
(0.0060) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0063) (0.0104) (0.0107)
Basel III−LCR 1.0180 0.4065 0.5529 1.0710 0.3782 0.5253 1.1243 0.3175 0.4843
(0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0096) (0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0108)
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Table A.4: Normalised average output values across experiments.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9899 0.9860 1.0006 0.9903 0.9864 1.0003 0.9905 0.9866
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III 0.9743 0.9846 0.9819 0.9951 0.9880 0.9845 0.9987 0.9894 0.9860
(0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−CAR3 0.9991 0.9889 0.9851 1.0003 0.9898 0.9861 0.9999 0.9905 0.9866
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−CConB 0.9953 0.9876 0.9841 0.9993 0.9893 0.9855 0.9996 0.9901 0.9864
(0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−LR 0.9742 0.9846 0.9820 0.9951 0.9880 0.9845 0.9987 0.9894 0.9860
(0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−CCyB 0.9734 0.9839 0.9819 0.9957 0.9881 0.9846 0.9990 0.9895 0.9860
(0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−SIBs 0.9817 0.9862 0.9831 0.9964 0.9885 0.9855 0.9993 0.9900 0.9862
(0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Basel III−LCR 0.9723 0.9842 0.9817 0.9948 0.9879 0.9845 0.9983 0.9895 0.9860
(0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Table A.5: Normalised unemployment rates across experiments.
Bailout Bailin P&A
T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c T Rpi T Rpi,u T Rpi,u,c
Basel II 1.0000 2.0592 2.5533 0.9363 1.9954 2.4881 0.9708 1.9772 2.4658
(0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0134) (0.0153)
Basel III 4.2854 2.6934 3.0353 1.5644 2.2725 2.7147 1.1331 2.1089 2.5447
(0.3389) (0.0432) (0.0349) (0.1365) (0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0180) (0.0172)
Basel III−CAR3 1.0844 2.1687 2.6552 0.9588 2.0570 2.5260 0.9993 1.9769 2.4700
(0.0228) (0.0158) (0.0184) (0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0182) (0.0134) (0.0151)
Basel III−CConB 1.5437 2.3303 2.7762 1.0537 2.1125 2.6017 1.0297 2.0284 2.4899
(0.1386) (0.0208) (0.0216) (0.0485) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0195) (0.0150) (0.0148)
Basel III−LR 4.2999 2.6970 3.0251 1.5662 2.2722 2.7144 1.1327 2.1089 2.5447
(0.3404) (0.0431) (0.0336) (0.1363) (0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0289) (0.0180) (0.0172)
Basel III−CCyB 4.4012 2.7777 3.0407 1.4846 2.2568 2.7018 1.0981 2.1050 2.5431
(0.3333) (0.0551) (0.0360) (0.1394) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0233) (0.0173) (0.0170)
Basel III−SIBs 3.3169 2.5028 2.9004 1.4167 2.2059 2.6001 1.0674 2.0432 2.5171
(0.2901) (0.0432) (0.0513) (0.1182) (0.0224) (0.0175) (0.0231) (0.0165) (0.0168)
Basel III−LCR 4.5631 2.7413 3.0643 1.6020 2.2842 2.7135 1.1834 2.1040 2.5475
(0.3554) (0.0561) (0.0379) (0.1507) (0.0238) (0.0213) (0.0398) (0.0182) (0.0175)
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